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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Tullock Contest
1.1.1 Economic Relevance and Characterization of Contests
Competition in which exogenously given assets are allocated as a function
of the various efforts expended by players in trying to win these assets is a
very common phenomenon. These interaction for goods or rents in which
players expend effort in trying to get ahead of their rivals is embraced by
the term contest. Effort in contests can be expended in monetary form or
in the form of other valuable resources depending on the external circum-
stances. Some areas of application of the contest theory are promotional
competition (Friedman (1958), Mills (1961) and Schmalensee (1976)), liti-
gation (Farmer and Pecorino (1999), Wa¨rneryd (2000), Baye, Kovenock, and
de Vries (2005) and Robson and Skaperdas (2008)), internal labor market
tournaments (Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986)), R&D contests
(Loury (1979) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)) and sports (surveyed by
Szymanski (2003)).
A contest in this work can be characterized by the following elements:
• A (finite) set of contestants, also called players or agents, denoted by
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• An exogenously given prize with the valuation V ∈ Q+, which will be
allocated among the players.
1
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• A set of possible actions, yielding a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn), xi ∈ R+0
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} of efforts. These efforts determine the probability
of obtaining the whole prize or the fraction of the prize obtained by
each player. In the work at hand we focus on the ’winner takes all’
interpretation which means that one player earns the whole prize.
• Function pi(x1, . . . , xn) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that maps the vector of ef-
forts into winning probabilities. Usually, this function is called contest
success function (CSF). For a given vector of efforts the winning prob-
abilities pi are between zero and one and sum up to 1.
• Function Ci(xi) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that states the cost of providing a given
level of effort. We will assume in this work that Ci(xi) = xi ∀i ∈ N .
Assuming that players are risk-neutral with payoffs linear on the expected
prize and costs, the payoff function of player i depends on the effort choices
and is given as
Πi(x1, . . . , xn) = pi(x1, . . . , xn)V − xi.
1.1.2 Rent-Seeking
The literature of contest theory has developed from the seminal contribu-
tions by Tullock (1967, 1980) and Kru¨ger (1974) who studied a specific con-
test, rent-seeking. Rent-seeking is a contest in which the expended efforts
are presumed to be wasted from a welfare perspective. Tullock (1967) ex-
plored this feature of rent-seeking without naming it with this specific term.
He sought to explain the low profit of a firm that has monopoly power due
to an entry barrier by reasoning that such a firm may have had to invest in
achieving that barrier and in keeping it high. The part in his article that was
to be most important in the development of the concept of rent-seeking was
the investment in the activity of securing protection from the government
(see Tullock (1967), p.231).1 The term rent-seeking had not been introduced
until Kru¨ger (1974). Since then a whole school of researchers analyzed the
implications of rent-seeking in many specific contexts such as competition
for temporal and non-temporal monopoly rents, the choice between lobbying
1See Tullock (2003) for his account of the development of the concept rent-seeking.
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and litigation (Rubin, Curran, and Curran (2001)), election campaigns, le-
gal conflicts such as lawsuit, contested tenders and public projects, bribery,
rivalry between tribes and military combats, R&D and patent races (Loury
(1979), Beath, Katsoulacos, and Ulph (1989), Nti (1997)), conflict and ap-
propriation (Garfinkel and Skaperdas (1996)), non-price competition (Huck,
Konrad, and Mu¨ller (2002)) and contests between cities and countries to
host prestige events such as the Olympic Games (Corchon (2000)). For
an early survey of the rent-seeking literature see Nitzan (1994), for a more
recent collection of papers see Lockard and Tullock (2001) and Congleton,
Hillman, and Konrad (2008). The rent-seeking literature is concerned with
the existence and characterization of Nash equilibria and, in particular, with
the relationship between total rent-seeking outlays in equilibrium and the
value of the contested rent. The ratio RD =
∑n
i=1 xi/V between these two
values is called the rent dissipation. The analysis of the basic rent-seeking
game depends on the assumptions made regarding the payoff function, the
contest success function and the number and characteristics of the players.
Players’ preferences differ concerning their attitude towards risk, their valu-
ations of the rent and, in general, their utility, which in all determines their
strategy sets and their payoffs. In this work we concentrate on the varieties
generated through different utility functions of the players.
1.1.3 The Tullock Contest Success Function
Perhaps the most popular contest success function, which is typically at-
tributed to Tullock (1980), is used in several areas of economics. Tullock
was the first who used it to study the problem of rent-seekers who expend
resources to influence the policy outcome in their favor. Therefore, this fa-
mous contest success function is labeled after him and we call a contest with
such a logit form CSF and a cost function Ci(xi) = xi a Tullock contest.
This CSF is a simple and tractable function, which assumes that a contes-
tant i’s probability of winning the contest depends on this contestant’s own
effort and the sum of all efforts
pi(x1, . . . , xn) =

xri∑n
j=1 x
r
j
if max{x1, . . . , xn} > 0
1/n otherwise
.
The probability for individual i to win the contest, pi, is increasing in i’s
own effort and decreasing in rivals’ effort. The technology parameter r ∈
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R+0 ∪{∞} represents the efficiency of the given contest technology. r is also
called the discriminatory power of the contest, because it determines how
much impact a player’s own effort has on his winning probability. For r = 1,
the winning probability is equal to the share of expenditure of a player in
the total expenditure. It is like a lottery in which one monetary unit buys
one lottery ticket, and the winner is drawn from the set of all tickets with
each ticket winning with the same probability. Therefore, a contest with
r = 1 is called a lottery contest. This case of constant marginal efficiency
is particularly popular because of its analytical tractability. Whereas, the
parameter r 6= 1 is important for the marginal impact of an increase in a
contestant’s effort. For small values of the technology parameter, 0 < r < 1,
the marginal effectiveness decreases in effort but the reaction function is
always positive as long as we have symmetric players and no entry fee. A
strictly positive reaction function means that always all symmetric players
participate in the contest. In the limit case r = 0 each player regardless of
the effort has a winning probability of pi =
1
n . Therefore, none of the players
would spent positive effort in the equilibrium. In contrast, for higher values,
r > 1, the marginal effectiveness increases in effort and it is possible that not
all players participate actively with a positive effort choice in the contest.
As r → ∞ the contest success function converges towards a function with
no noise, the all-pay-auction, in which no pure strategy equilibrium exists.2
In the limit case, r = ∞, the player with the highest effort wins the prize
with certainty.
The Tullock contest success function is the underlying CSF for the whole
work. In Chapter 3 we analyze the influence of different technology pa-
rameters r on the contest equilibria where we explicitly allow for r > 1.
Afterwards, in the first two sections of Chapter 4 we assume r < 1 and
finally in Chapter 2 and the last section of Chapter 4 we use in view of
tractability the most restrictive assumption of r = 1.
Why is this Tullock contest so popular? Beside the tractability there are
two different types of justification.
Axiomatic Foundation
Bell, Keeney, and Little (1975), Skaperdas (1996), Clark and Riis (1998)
2See e.g. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996).
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and Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997) give systems of axioms about how
conflict is decided as a function of the players’ efforts so that these sets
of axioms imply that the contest success function are logit form variants
of the famous Tullock contest success function. Bell, Keeney, and Little
(1975) were probably the first to address this problem in the framework
of promotional competition for market shares. Their pioneering work in
this field, the axiomatic foundation, can be also translated into the contest
framework. Skaperdas (1996) derives the Tullock contest function for a
lottery contest (r = 1) from several intuitive axioms. Skaperdas’ axioms
are:
1.
∑
i∈N pi(x) = 1 and pi(x) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N and xi > 0⇒ pi(xi) > 0.
2. ∀i ∈ N : pi(x) is increasing in xi, and decreasing in xj ∀j 6= i.
3. For any permutation ξ of N we have pξ(i)(x) = p(xξ1 , . . . , xξn)∀i ∈ N .
4. pmi (x) =
pi(x)∑
j∈M pj(x)
∀i ∈M and ∀M ⊆ N with |M| ≥ 2.
5. pmi (x) is independent of the efforts of the players not included in the
subset M.
6. pi(ωx) = pi(x) ∀ω > 0 and ∀i ∈ N .
Axiom 1 ensures that the winning probabilities lie in the interval [0, 1] and
sum up to one for all players. It is called the probability axiom. The
second axiom states that raising one player’s effort strictly increases this
player’s winning probability and decreases the rivals’ winning probabilities.
The axiom on the symmetry of players (axiom 3) that makes the players
anonymous respectively homogeneous is often criticized in the literature.
Axiom 3 implies that any two players who exert equal efforts have equal
probabilities of winning the contest. The more important axioms are on
invariance properties of the nature of the contest with respect to the number
of participants (axioms 4 and 5). Axiom 4 implies that the contest among
smaller numbers of players are qualitatively similar to those among a larger
number of them. Axiom 5, the independence from irrelevant alternatives
axiom, satisfies that whenever the contest is played only among a subgroup of
the initial group the winning probabilities of the participating players do not
depend on non-participating players. Most importantly, a zero-homogeneity
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axiom (axiom 6) that makes contest success probabilities invariant with
respect to an increase in all contestants’ effort by some given factor. Given
these six axioms there is just one contest success function which satisfies
all of the axioms. It is the Tullock contest success function. This one-to-
one relationship between the Tullock contest and these axioms gives strong
support for the use of this contest success function in actual applications.
A slightly different set of axioms is stated by Kooreman and Schoonbeek
(1997) for the two players case and by Clark and Riis (1998) for n-players.
For example Clark and Riis (1998) drop the anonymity axiom while they re-
tain the other axioms. This extension of Skaperdas’ work leads to a modified
version of the Tullock contest success function that allows for heterogeneity
between players. Hence, one may view the crucial properties of Tullock’s
contest success functions to be homogeneity and independence of irrelevant
alternatives.
Microeconomic Underpinnings
Another important reason why the Tullock contest is often used comes from
the literature that provides an economic underpinning for this mechanism.
In this literature there are mostly probability models described, in which
winning is a function of efforts. Such models make a strong case for the
lottery contest (r = 1). They can be found in the framework of R&D races,
innovation tournaments and patent-race games (Hirshleifer and Riley (1992)
and Baye and Hoppe (2003)). To give an impression of these microeconomic
underpinnings we roughly summarize Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, p.380f.).
Starting point is a R&D race between two contestants in form of an all-pay
auction for the fixed prize V . Player 1 wins the competition if q1x1 > q2x2,
where xi are the chosen effort levels and qi are independent draws from an
exponential distribution with the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.)
G(q) = 1− e−aq and the probability density function (p.d.f.) g(q) = ae−aq.
The parameter a, often called the rate parameter, is a to the exponential
distribution inherent real number with a > 0. In probability theory, the
exponential distributions are a class of continuous probability distributions.
Normally, they describe the times between events in a process in which
events occur continuously and independently at a constant average rate.
The noise that is introduced by this exponential distribution translates this
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all-pay auction problem into the Tullock contest problem. For a given qˆ1
and for given (x1, x2), contestant 2 wins if qˆ1x1 < q2x2 which happens with
probability
prob(qˆ1x1 < q2x2) = prob(qˆ1x1/x2 < q2)
= 1− prob(q2 ≤ qˆ1x1/x2)
= 1− (1− e−a(qˆ1x1/x2))
= e−a(qˆ1x1/x2)
Now, we integrate by parts to consider the unconditional probability for
player 2 to win the all-pay auction for (x1, x2).
prob(q1x1 < q2x2) =
∫ ∞
0
e−a(q1x1/x2)g(q1)dq1
=
∫ ∞
0
e−a(q1x1/x2)[ae−aq1 ]dq1
= a
∫ ∞
0
e
−aq1 x1+x2x2 dq1
= a
[
−1
a
x2
(x1 + x2)
e
−aq1 x1+x2x2
]∞
0
= − x2
x1 + x2
[0− 1]
=
x2
x1 + x2
This is a straightforward foundation for using the Tullock success function
as a probability for winning a contest. In this explanation it is based on
the all-pay auction, but with some multiplicative noise that follows from a
particular type of distribution.
Another largely unrecognized microeconomic underpinning of the logit win
probability function is given in Clark and Riis (1996). They link the win
probability to the behavior of the contest designer. Their approach of a
discrete choice framework also adopts a random utility formulation in which
it is assumed that the contestants view the contest designer as maximizing
a random utility function. The players expect that the designer will deter-
mine as the winner the player who gives him the most utility. The utility
depends on the effort spend by the players and on an unknown stochas-
tic idiosyncratic bias. The interpretation to justify this utility function is
that the players do not possess all relevant information about the contest
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designer and are not exactly certain of his preferences. Assuming that the
utility maximizing contest designer has deterministic preferences which are
represented by an specific additively separable logarithmic utility function
and that the uncertainty of the players is captured by a specific probability
distribution lead to precisely the Tullock win probability.
1.1.4 Voluntary Participation
In many contests the choice of whether or not to participate with a posi-
tive effort is decided voluntarily by the players. For an early contribution
considering entry into Tullock contests see Appelbaum and Katz (1986). If
the winner in a contest is awarded a prize that has a positive value for the
player but all losers receive nothing, intuition suggests that a player may
want to expend at least some effort trying to win the prize if there is no
entry fee for the contest. This intuition is right for the case of an decreasing
returns to scale technology. Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) show that in
the case r < 1, for any number of homogeneous agents n, there is always a
unique equilibrium in which the expected payoffs are strictly positive. There
is therefore always some incentive for a potential entrant to decide to par-
ticipate in rent-seeking. If r > 1, then as long as n is smaller as a threshold
value, any potential entrant has some incentive to enter in the game. When
the threshold value is reached, an agent contemplating entry will not engage
in the process of rent-seeking because by doing so he will receive a negative
expected payoff.
Apart from the technology parameter the decision of a player to take actively
part in a contest will generally depend on how much other players are willing
to expend. This is an interesting question in the context of a heterogeneous
players field. For instance, if other players have a higher valuation, and,
therefore expend considerable more effort, it need not be worthwhile for a
player who values the prize less to expend effort. It may be preferable not
to compete at all. The theory states that in Tullock contests, if the group
of contestants is large and heterogeneous, players whose valuation of the
prize is low or whose ability is low may prefer not to make a positive effort.
Participation with asymmetric players in the Tullock contest is addressed
by Stein (2002). He focuses on heterogeneity due to different valuation of
the prize and due to a different relative ability to win the prize. Whereas we
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concentrate on the participation decision of asymmetric players in a Tullock
contest, in which the heterogeneity arises through differences in the utility
functions. They differ in the parameter value of other regarding preferences.
In addition we analyze the influence of the technology parameter of the
contest on the participation condition (Chapter 3).
1.1.5 Nested Contests - Intra Group Contests
In a real world contest, players expend efforts trying to win some prize.
The process by which the efforts translate into success probabilities is often
considered as a black box. However, if we look closer at contest games,
they often reveal a finer substructure and can be decomposed into a num-
ber of smaller battles on different stages of the contest. This is obvious
with sports contests. Similarly, researchers in the R&D context noted that
research and development is not a single one-shot event (see, e.g., Har-
ris and Vickers (1985) and Harris and Vickers (1987)). Related problems
have been analyzed in the context of political campaigns (Klumpp and Pol-
born (2006)), violent conflicts for territory, resources or power (Mehlum and
Moene (2004), McBride and Skaperdas (2007)) and, with a multiplicity of
applications in mind, by Gradstein and Konrad (1999), Amegashie (1999,
2000), McAfee (2000), Moldovanu and Sela (2006), Groh, Moldovanu, Sela,
and Sunde (2008), Konrad and Kovenock (2005, forthcoming, 2009) and
Matros (2006).
One special type of a grand contest with interesting efficiency properties
emerges naturally from the analysis of inter-group contests. Conflict often
takes place between groups. Once the inter-group contest has determined a
winning group such conflict ends if the prize that is awarded to the winning
group is a good that all group members can consume (public good) or if
the allocation of the good within the group cannot be influenced by group
members (exogenous sharing rule). In many cases, the inter-group contest
is about private goods, and the conflict does not necessarily end once the
contest prize is allocated to one of the groups, or once its shares are allo-
cated to the different groups. Examples come from war, politics, sports,
federalism, corporate governance and other areas of conflict. In politics,
leading figures inside a political party often join forces prior to an election,
trying to get their party into power. Once this goal is achieved, they may
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start struggling about who will obtain which office, and who will eventually
become the party leader (Chapter 4).
It seems plausible that the rules that govern the allocation of the prize will
affect the group members’ efforts in winning the battle. Those rules can
be distinguished in three classes; exogenous sharing rules, groups choice of
sharing rules and an intra-group conflict as a sharing rule. We focus in this
work on the case of an intra-group contest. It is often plausible that group
members will struggle about the intra-group allocation of the prize, regard-
less how much each of them has contributed in the inter-group conflict. In
this case, the intra-group allocation can be seen as the outcome of an intra-
group contest in which the members’ contribution to the inter-group contest
are sunk and irrelevant for the intra-group allocation of the prize. The sem-
inal paper on this topic in which the group prize is contested among the
members of the winning group once the winning group has been determined
is Katz and Tokatlidu (1996). They analyze this type of problem and pro-
vide the comparative statics with a focus on group size. Wa¨rneryd (1998),
who studies this problem in the context of conflict between more than two
jurisdictions within a federation, and with more than two symmetric players
in each jurisdiction, finds that this structure may have advantages compared
to a one-stage contest in which no group structures exist and the prize is
allocated in a single Tullock contest with the same number of participants.
He finds that a more hierarchical structure can be advantageous as it tends
to reduce the total effort that is expended in the various contests for allo-
cating the prize. We show in Chapter 4 that the hierarchical structure is
not in general preferable to a single one-stage contest.
1.2 (Negatively) Interdependent Preferences
The principal ingredient of our analysis is the assumption of interdependent
preferences. Interdependent preferences could be altruistic or spiteful, al-
truism representing a positive and spite representing a negative interdepen-
dency, respectively. Our focus though will be on negatively interdependent
preferences in rent-seeking contests. Not because we think that negatively
interdependent preferences are the most relevant ones empirically, but rather
because we want to point out that negatively interdependent preferences and
independent preferences can result in other decisions when comparing and
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choosing different contest design. We say a player has negatively interde-
pendent preferences if the material payoff of other players negatively enters
his utility. In contrast, we say a player has independent preferences if the
utility of his actions does not depend on the material consequences for other
players. Negatively interdependent preferences reflect the widely acknowl-
edged phenomenon of keeping up with the Joneses (i.e. well-being depend on
relative standing in the society). The idea that the welfare of an individual
depends on the absolute as well as on the relative income goes at least as
far back as to Veblen (1899):
”. . . the desire for wealth can scarcely be satiated in any individual instance
. . . the ground of [this need] is the desire of every one to excel every one else
in the accumulation of goods.” (Veblen (1899), p.32)3
One obvious channel through which an individual’s well-being could depend
on others’ incomes is one’s envious feelings towards other. Another, maybe
more important and in the Veblen (1899) citation mentioned factor is the de-
sirability of higher status, or more generally speaking, the simple attraction
towards being better off than others. We formalize this postulate through
negatively interdependent preferences in this thesis.
1.2.1 ‘Other-Regarding’ Preferences
For decades, microeconomic science was built on a specification of indepen-
dent preferences that implied rational and purely self-interested behavior.
Common sense and experimental as well as field evidence point to the limits
of this approach. There exist some stylized facts as for example inexplica-
ble rejections in Ultimatum games that cannot be fully accounted for by
the standard approach of rational and material payoff maximizing behav-
ior. One way to tackle this problem is to deviate from the assumption of
independent preferences while maintaining the rational choice hypothesis,
as we do it here. This idea has been used by a number of theorists who
integrate all different kinds of other-regarding behavior into the individual
preference model. We can classify most of the approaches into four promi-
nent theories. Firstly, the theory of reciprocity, assuming agents to act in
a reciprocal way. Reciprocity refers to a tendency to respond to perceived
kindness with kindness, to perceived meanness with meanness and to expect
3Also cited in Becker (1974) and Ok and Kockesen (2000).
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this behavior from others. Authors, who use the reciprocity approach are,
among others, Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Secondly, the theory developed by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) uses the idea
of inequality aversion. It is based on the supposition that agents are not
only interested in their own payoff, but also in their relative payoff. Agents
compare their own payoff with the payoff of the others people and would
like to reduce the inequality in payoffs between people. Thirdly, Charness
and Rabin (2002) propose a theory of social preferences that assumes that
agents care in their preference function about their own payoff, the others’
payoff and, in addition, about efficiency in the allocation process. Fourthly,
the theory of altruism is investigated by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and
Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie (2003). They model a concern for altruism
and efficiency by defining utility functions for keeping for oneself and giving
to others.
There are various assumptions in the models with respect to the interdepen-
dency of preferences. The modeler makes the assumptions when specifying
the identities of the players. Our special approach of interdependent pref-
erences joins into the other-regarding preference approaches and focuses on
those preferences which maintain that well-being depend on material con-
sumption as well as on relative standing in the society. Therefore, we assume
that preferences depend on own payoff and on the payoffs of other players
in the form that agents are spiteful. This thesis does not claim to have the
solely right answer to the question of how to model interdependent prefer-
ences, it rather picks one kind of interdependent preference model, envious
preferences, and shows that it produces in comparison to independent payoff
maximization in different contest situations completely different equilibria.
1.2.2 Empirical, Experimental and Other Evidence
Nevertheless the empirical foundation of interdependent preferences is rather
old. A first empirical basis for interdependent preferences is laid by Due-
senberry (1949), followed beside others by Layard (1980) and Frank (1985).
Frank (1985) (p.5) notes that “. . . abundant evidence suggests that people
do in fact care much more about how their incomes compare with those of
their peers than about how large their incomes are in any absolute sense.
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Most poor citizens of the United States enjoy an absolute consumption stan-
dard that would be the envy of all but the richest citizens of, say, India. Yet
the poor here are often said to be much less content with their lot than are
the upper-middle class citizens of many poorer nations.”
More recent empirical support of the interdependent preference hypothesis
is given by Bush (1994a,b) and Kapteyn, van der Geer, van de Stadt, and
Wansbeck (1997), who uses field data. In the last few years verification of
interdependent preferences is created through laboratory experiments. An-
dreoni and Miller (2002) and Fishman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) find
that individual behavior can be rationalized to a great extent with a well-
behaved utility function which orders different than material payoff max-
imization. According to them the shape of this function can be of great
heterogeneity among subjects. More concrete support for the economic rel-
evance of interdependent preferences based on experimental data is given
by Levine (1998). He analyzes experimentally ultimatum games and final
rounds of a centipede game and finds a specific distribution of altruism and
spite in the population. The surprising fact is that a large mass of individ-
uals are strongly spiteful. This result should be even more pronounced in a
more competitive setting like a contest. There are also studies which predict
much less spiteful behavior in the population (Andreoni and Miller (2008)
and Offerman, Sonnemans, and Schram (1996)). Another experiment indi-
cating negatively interdependent preferences is by Zizzo and Oswald (2000).
They included a ‘burning money’ stage after a betting stage, in which half
of the people have an advantage over the others and some of them get an
additional gift. There, subjects have the chance to give up some own money
to reduce other subjects’ money. Zizzo and Oswald find that despite these
cost the majority of the subjects choose to destroy at least part of others’
money. The same result is found by Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter (2008)
in their experiment on public goods with an added punishment stage. This
phenomenon cannot be explained by the standard assumption in economic
theory of selfish independent payoff maximizing individuals. It supports the
hypothesis of negatively interdependent preferences.
Moreover, evidence for negatively interdependent preferences is generated
by the newer field of research of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary
stable behavior in two-player contests is identical to behavior of individuals
with negatively interdependent preferences in a Nash equilibrium. Leininger
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(2003) shows that stability of behavior according to an evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS) incorporates relative concerns of players, which guarantee
survival based on spiteful self-defense in the case of a finite population.
Whereas Leininger (2009) applies an indirect evolutionary approach (ESP),
which combines an evolutionary process at the preference level with rational
choice at the action level. He determines negatively interdependent prefer-
ences as evolutionarily stable which result in the same aggressive behavior
as the direct evolutionary approach. Whether evolution works at the action
level or at the preference level the resulting aggressive behavior in equilib-
rium is same as interdependent, spiteful preferences would create under the
Nash-equilibrium concept.
Eaton and Eswaran (2003) and Weibull and Salomonsson (2006) examine
how preferences evolve by natural selection in a competitive environment
and find that evolutionarily stable preferences exhibit a concern not only
for absolute payoffs but also for relative payoffs. Their finding is consistent
with the available anthropological evidence. This gives support from the
evolutionary context for the hypothesis of interdependent preferences.
Furthermore, there exist empirical evidences for interdependent preferences
from the point of view of the neurosciences, of heritability studies (twin
and adoption studies), and of cross-cultural and development psychology.
Zizzo (2003) gives an overview about the evidence provided in these stud-
ies. In particular, the different fields of studies argue about the question
whether genes or environment or both together determine what interdepen-
dent preferences an economic agent holds. Since we assume interdependent
preferences to be fixed in the most part of this thesis, we refer to the hy-
pothesis that interdependent preferences are innately coded in the genes (see
for this hypothesis beside others Bergstrom (1995), Hoffman, McCabe, and
Smith (1998), and McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1998)).
1.3 Literature concerning Contests with Interde-
pendent Preferences
Daily experience as well as experimental and field evidence strongly suggest
interdependent preferences to be present in the real world. Little has been
done so far to characterize the potential impact of interdependent prefer-
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ences on contest outcomes in general and on rent-seeking in particular. One
of a few contributions is Guse and Hehenkamp (2006). They analyze rent-
seeking contests with a heterogeneous population in which part of the players
are absolute payoff maximizers while others are also concerned about their
relative standing. As a result, it is those players with negatively interdepen-
dent preferences who experience a strategic advantage in general two-player
contests and in n-player contests with non-increasing marginal efficiency.
Another contribution to this field of research is Shaffer (2006), who exam-
ines the effect of preferences that are not independent (altruism or envy)
on equilibrium rent-seeking effort and net payoffs in a logit form contest.
Like Konrad (2004) Shaffer (2006) restricts her analysis to a one stage, two
players contest. Konrad (2004) analyzes altruism and envy in winner-take-
all contests, showing that altruistic and envy players together yield higher
payoffs than players who pursue independent self-interest.
Absolute and relative payoff maximization in a contest also occurs in an indi-
rect way in Leininger (2003) and Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov
(2004), who show that an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in a contest
leads to relative payoff maximization, in contrast to the Nash equilibrium,
which is based on absolute payoff maximization. Leininger (2009) shows that
the evolutionary stable preferences (ESP) of a finite population determined
by behavior in two-player contests turn out to be negatively interdependent.
We want to contribute with this thesis to this strand of literature.
1.4 Negatively Interdependent Preferences in Tul-
lock Contests
As in Bester and Gu¨th (1998) and Konrad (2004), we distinguish between
individual’s material payoffs in a Tullock contest
Πi(x1, . . . , xn) =
xri∑n
j=1 x
r
j
V − xi
and utility functions,
Fi(x1, . . . , xn) = Fi(Πi(x1, . . . , xn),Π−i(x1, . . . , xn)),
that describe an ordering of outcomes according to the individuals prefer-
ences. An individual’s preference depends on the own material payoff Πi
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and on the material payoff of all other players Π−i. The distinction between
utility and material payoff is inspired by sociobiology. There, material pay-
off determines the reproductive fitness of an individual and may differ from
the individuals subjective feelings of well-being.
We consider in this thesis a linear shape of the objective function. The utility
depends on own as well as on weighted average payoff. Hence, players have
a beat-the-average criterion in mind when choosing the effort in the contest.
Fi(x1, . . . , xn) = Πi + αi
1
n
n∑
j=1
Πj , (1.1)
where αi ∈ [−1, 0] is the individual preference parameter and specifies the
spitefulness of individual i. Utility and material payoff are identical for a
individual with independent preferences, meaning αi = 0 for those individu-
als. They differ for envious individuals who are concerned about their social
standing. Spiteful players have a preference parameter between −1 and 0
(αi ∈ [−1, 0[). The restriction that α can only take values between −1 and
0 ensures that the utility function of each player depends more on his own
payoff than on the averaged payoff.
Alternative specifications of relative payoff are also possible. For example,
a player might compare his own payoff to the average payoff of the other
players:
F˜i(x1, . . . , xn) = Πi + αi
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
Πj .
To compare the utility functions we get a closer look at the first order
conditions of two maximization problems. The first order condition of the
utility function (1.1) is given as
∂Fi
∂xi
=
∑n
j=1,j 6=i xj
(
∑n
j=1 xj)
2
V − 1− αi
n
(1.2)
whereas the first order condition for the alternative specification is given as
∂F˜i
∂xi
=
∑n
j=1,j 6=i xj
(
∑n
j=1 xj)
2
V (1− αi
n− 1)− 1. (1.3)
For the extreme case αi = 0 the first order conditions coincide. Solving for
the maximum in the other extreme case (αi = −1) yields to an identical
condition (
∑
j 6=i xj
(
∑
xj)2
V = n−1n ) and therewith to the same maximum value.
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Therefore, maximizing the utility function Fi is correlated to the maximiza-
tion of the utility function F˜i. Since we concentrate in this work on the
distribution of a rent and the arising incentives to spend effort in a contest,
we assume players to status seek and try to beat the average. Therefore, we
use the utility function (1.1).
1.5 Delegation
Interdependent preferences can be advantageous in the sense that spiteful
players earn strictly higher material payoffs than opponents do who seek
to maximize their material payoffs. Kockesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000) show
this advantage for certain classes of supermodular and submodular games
which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs. Guse and Hehenkamp
(2006) show the strategic advantage of players with interdependent pref-
erences in general two-player contests and in n-player contests with non-
increasing marginal efficiency.
Knowing about the strategic advantage of interdependent preferences this
feature can be used via a strategic move in advance to a competition.
“A strategic move is one that influences the other person’s choice, in a
manner favorable to one’s self, by affecting the other person’s expectations
on how one’s self will behave.” (Schelling (1960), p.160.)
Delegation, for instance in the case of firms that separate management from
ownership, can be interpreted as such a strategic move. Owners may benefit
from writing contracts with managers in which the compensation of the
latter is based, in part, on the performance of their firm relative to that
of other firms or relative to some industry average.4 This would provide
an incentive for managers to pursue the maximization of interdependent
payoffs. If we abstract from the evolutionary explanation of interdependent
preferences, delegation can be cited as another explanation for commitment
to a behavioral rule other than material payoff maximization, which induces
behavior equivalent to behavior of players with interdependent preferences.
An early analysis of strategic delegation in competitive situations can be
found in the context of Cournot and Bertrand models (Fershtman and Judd
4See Holmstrom (1982) for this idea.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 18
(1987) and Sklivas (1987)). Often competition can be better characterized
by a contest model. Dixit (1987) is the first to analyze strategic behavior
in contests. He conveys the results to the case of oligopolistic competition
for a homogeneous product with unit-elastic demand, where firms compete
for total market revenue by choosing different market shares. Specifically,
delegation in the context of Tullock contests, as we consider here, is analyzed
in Baik and Kim (1997), Wa¨rneryd (2000), Kra¨kel (2002), Kra¨kel and Sliwka
(2006) and Baik (2007). In Chapter 2 we extend this strand of literature
through the consideration of relative performance contracts and sequential
commitment to a contract.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis deals with the changes in the contest outcome emerging through
the consideration of negatively interdependent preferences. Before concen-
trating on the main topic, we show in Chapter 2 how contracts can arise,
which induce people to act as if they have interdependent preferences. Chap-
ter 3 introduces interdependent preferences into the framework of a one-stage
Tullock contest. First, we analyze the participation condition of players with
homogeneous interdependent preferences when the contest is characterized
by an increasing returns to scale technology. Afterwards, asymmetry due to
different interdependent preferences is added, and the reminder of Chapter 3
concentrates on the effort decision of heterogeneous players in a Tullock con-
test. After introducing interdependent preferences in the standard Tullock
contest we concentrate on the effect of interdependent preferences in more
complicated contest structures. In Chapter 4 the efficiency of a two-stage
grand contest (inter- and intra-group stage) and a single Tullock contest as
well as the efficiency of another two-stage contest are compared.5 The thesis
concludes in Chapter 5 with a summary of the main insights, a discussion
on the results, and areas for future research.
5Content and results of Sections 4.1 - 4.3 are published in Risse (2010). The original
publication is available at www.springerlink.com. c©Springer-Verlag
Chapter 2
Delegation in Competitions
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the incentives to commit to behav-
ioral rules different from pure material payoff maximization in competitions.
It is shown that commitment to a behavioral rule can lead to strategic ad-
vantages. There are two interpretations of the behavioral rule commitment
setting. In the indirect evolutionary approach (Gu¨th and Yaari (1992)) com-
mitment operates through preferences. Whereas we focus in this chapter on
the second approach, on delegation. Delegation, for instance in the case of
firms that separate management from ownership, can be used as a commit-
ment to a behavioral rule of the firm owners in games. Owners, whose payoff
are given by the game payoff function, may benefit from writing contracts
with managers in which the compensation of the latter is based, in part,
on the performance of their firm relative to that of other firms or relative
to some industry average. This would provide an incentive for managers
to act more spiteful in the competition than the payoff maximizing owner.
This constructs a setting as if the managers pursue the maximization of
interdependent utility functions.
An early analysis of strategic delegation in competition situations can be
found in the context of Cournot and Bertrand models (Fershtman and Judd
(1987) and Sklivas (1987)). They focus on management contracts based
on sales and payoffs that are chosen simultaneously. We extend their work
by introducing sequential contracting and as a second focus relative perfor-
19
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mance contracts (Section 2.2).
Beside Cournot and Bertrand models competition is often stylized in a con-
test model. Dixit (1987) is the first to analyze commitment to a behavioral
rule through delegation in contests. Later, Baik and Kim (1997), Baik
(2007), Wa¨rneryd (2000), Kra¨kel (2002) and Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2006) fo-
cus their analysis on delegation in the context of a Tullock contests, as we
consider here. The last two analyze linear incentive schemes for managers
based on sales and profits, Kra¨kel (2002) for two players and Kra¨kel and
Sliwka (2006) for the n-player case. Kra¨kel (2002) shows that there exists a
strategic advantage of precommitment in an all-pay auction and that there
is none in Tullock contests with two players. The resulting outcome depends
on the number of players. In the two-player contest the optimal delegation
involves giving agents incentive to maximize owner’s payoff while in con-
tests with more than two players commitment to another strategy creates
an evolutionary stable equilibrium. Their work is the closest to the Section
2.3 of this thesis, but in contrast to them we analyze relative performance
contracts instead of sales and profits as the delegation contract space. Pos-
sajennikov (2009, 2008) goes a step further and generalizes these results on
delegation in general contests, relates them to properties of indirect evolu-
tion and delegation in general symmetric games.
The chapter is organized as follows1: It starts with a note on delegation
in Cournot competition (Section 2.2). Afterwards it follows a section about
delegation in Tullock contests (Section 2.3). The main focus of both sections
lies in the calculation of the respective equilibria. We assume the structure of
the game as exogenously given. Therefore, the firm owners have to delegate
the decision in the competition stage.
2.2 Delegation in Cournot Competitions
2.2.1 Introduction
The aim of this section is to study managerial delegation in Cournot compe-
titions where management contracts are chosen sequentially. In the seminal
papers by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987)
1The papers which are the basis for this chapter are joint work with Tobias Wenzel.
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attention is restricted to management contracts that are chosen simulta-
neously. In these papers, the owners of a firm may offer a contract to a
manager. There are more than enough managers available on the job mar-
ket. Hence, they accept the offered contracts. After this contract stage, the
manager decides how much output to produce in a Cournot competition.
The purpose of our section is to investigate the changes that arise when
contracts are chosen sequentially, that is, one firm can commit to a contract
before the other firm can do so.
This framework is chosen to study the behavior of market leaders or dom-
inant firms and its impact on the market outcome. Behavior of market
leaders is often modeled by assuming that the market leader can commit to
an action before smaller competitors can do. Formally, this is done by choos-
ing the sequential time structure with the market leader choosing first and
smaller firms following. The previous literature has been concerned with, for
instance, investments in capacity, cost reducing-investments, multi-market
contact, bundling of goods and so on.2 This paper complements this lit-
erature by analyzing the behavior of a market leader when the leader can
commit to management incentive contracts.
The present section shows that if contracts are chosen sequentially, the leader
chooses a contract which induces the manager to become more aggressive
in the market stage. The follower chooses a contract that leads to less
aggressive management behavior. There is a first-mover advantage. The
leader earns higher profits than the follower. We consider two classes of
incentive contracts: firstly, contracts that are based on profits and sales
and secondly, relative performance contracts that are based on own and
competitors’ profits. Our results holds for both classes of contracts, but are
more pronounced for relative performance contracts.
We analyze the welfare implications of our model. Efficiency under sequen-
tial contracting is higher than under simultaneous contracting. The reason
is that sequential contracting leads to higher output and lower prices.
Delegation games have received widespread attention since the mid-eighties:
Among others, the decision whether or not to hire a manager at all has been
studied by Basu (1995) and Lambertini (2000). Different classes of con-
tracts have been considered, market share contracts (Jansen, van Lier, and
2See, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Tirole (1988) or Etro (2006, 2007).
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van Witteloostuijn (2007), Ritz (2008)), and relative performance contracts
(Salas Fumas (1992), Miller and Pazgal (2001)). Recently, Mujumdar and
Pal (2007) extend contracting to dynamic production environments.
The first part of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2.2, we outline
a model setup with linear profit-sales contracts and study the simultaneous
contracting benchmark. In Section 2.2.3, we analyze the outcome under
sequential contracting. Section 2.2.4 extends our results to a three-firm
oligopoly. Section 2.2.5 considers relative performance contracts. In Section
2.2.6 we conclude.
2.2.2 The Model
Consider a duopoly market where demand is given by p = 1− q1− q2, where
p is the price and qi is firm i’s output. There is a unit-cost of c < 1 for
producing the output. Firm i’s profit function is
Πi = (1− q1 − q2 − c)qi, (2.1)
and its sales function is
Si = (1− q1 − q2)qi. (2.2)
Firm owners do not decide on output, but delegate this decision to a man-
ager. The manager is offered an incentive contract which is a linear combi-
nation of profits and sales:
g˜i = wiΠi + (1− wi)Si, (2.3)
where wi is the weight on profits. Managers strive to maximize income
from this contract. As in Fershtman and Judd (1987), the manager’s total
compensation package is given by ai+big˜i, bi > 0 where ai and bi are chosen
by owner i so that the manager’s compensation just equals his reservation
value. It is further assumed that this reservation value is zero so that it will
always pay for an owner to delegate the decision.
The game we study consists of two stages, the contract stage and the mar-
ket stage. In the contract stage, firm owners decide on the contract offered
to managers. As our benchmark case, we analyze simultaneous contracting
as in the Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987)
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models. After the contracting stage whose outcome is announced publicly,
the market stage follows where managers decide on output (Cournot com-
petition). We look for a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Let us first study our benchmark case with simultaneous contracting. In
the market stage, managers choose quantities to maximize income from the
incentive contract:
g˜i = wi(1− qi − qj − c)qi + (1− wi)(1− qi − qj)qi. (2.4)
This yields the following quantities chosen in the market stage:
qi =
1 + wjc− 2wic
3
. (2.5)
Inserting (2.5) into (2.1), profits can be expressed depending on the contract
parameters (wi, wj):
Πi =
(1 + wic+ wjc− 3c)(1 + wjc− 2wic)
9
. (2.6)
Firm owners choose simultaneously the incentive contract to maximize prof-
its, that is, the owner of firm i chooses the weight wi to maximize (2.6).
3 In
equilibrium, firm owners choose the following incentive contracts:
w¯ = w¯1 = w¯2 =
6c− 1
5c
. (2.7)
The weight on sales (1 − w¯) is strictly positive since c < 1. That is own-
ers have an incentive to deviate manager incentives away from pure profit
maximization.
Corresponding profits are:
Π¯1 = Π¯2 =
2(1− c)2
25
. (2.8)
Firms choose the same incentive contract resulting in the same profits for
both firms. Those profits are lower than the resultant profits in the Nash
equilibrium without delegation. Hence, the firms would prefer not to dele-
gate if they have the choice. In this framework they do not have the choice.
Delegation is exogenous given, because the focus lies in the equilibria dif-
ferences between simultaneous and sequential contracting and not in the
differences between delegation and no delegation.
3The second-order conditions are fulfilled.
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2.2.3 Sequential Contracting
Suppose now that contracting takes place sequentially. Assume that firm 1
announces the contract with its manager first. The owner of firm 2 observes
this contract and then offers a contract to his manager. The outcome from
the market stage is identical to simultaneous contracting (Eq.(2.5)). Ob-
serving the contract of firm 1, the owner of firm 2 chooses a contract with
weight
w2(w1) =
6c− 1− w1c
4c
. (2.9)
Anticipating the optimal choice by firm 2, profits of firm 1 are:
Π1 =
(1 + w1c+ w2(w1)c− 3c)(1 + w2(w1)c− 2w1c)
9
. (2.10)
Maximization with respect to w1 yields the optimal weight chosen by the
owner of firm 1:
w∗1 =
4c− 1
3c
. (2.11)
Plugging into (2.9) gives the optimal weight for the incentive contract of
firm 2:
w∗2 =
7c− 1
6c
. (2.12)
Equilibrium incentive contracts are asymmetric. As w∗1 < w∗2, firm 1 puts
more weight on the sales part, hence this firm induces its manager to be more
aggressive in the subsequent market stage. Comparison with the benchmark
case shows that w∗1 < w¯ < w∗2, that is, compared to simultaneous contract-
ing, the leader (follower) puts more (less) weight on sales. Corresponding
profits are:
Π∗1 =
(1− c)2
12
, (2.13)
Π∗2 =
(1− c)2
18
. (2.14)
As Π∗1 =
3
2Π
∗
2, firm 1 earns higher profits than firm 2. Comparing the equi-
librium profits of the sequential contracting with those of the simultaneous
contracting shows Π∗1 > Π¯ > Π∗2. Hence, there is a first-mover advantage.
Summarizing our results:
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Result 2.1 When incentive contracts are chosen sequentially
i) the leader puts more weight on sales and earns higher profits than the
follower, and
ii) compared to simultaneous incentive contracts, the leader (follower)
puts more (less) weight on sales and earns higher (lower) payoff.
We can now turn to a welfare comparison between simultaneous and sequen-
tial contracting. Output under sequential contracting exceeds output under
simultaneous contracting which in turn leads to lower prices, (1+4c)/5 when
contracts are announced simultaneously and (1 + 5c)/6 when contracts are
announced sequentially. As prices are now closer to marginal costs efficiency
increases. Consumer and total welfare increases while industry profits de-
crease.
Result 2.2 Sequential contracting generates greater output, lower prices,
higher total welfare and lower industry profits than simultaneous contracting.
2.2.4 The Three-Firm Case
We are interested whether our results from the two-firm case are robust
with respect to the number of firms in the market. Therefore, we study
an oligopoly market with three firms. Assume that firm 1 announces its
contract first, firm 2 second, and firm 3 last. As the analysis follows along the
same lines as the duopoly case, we skip derivations and present immediately
optimal contract weights:
wˆ1 =
13c− 4
9c
, (2.15)
wˆ2 =
11c− 2
9c
, (2.16)
wˆ3 =
10c− 1
9c
. (2.17)
As wˆ1 < wˆ2 < wˆ3, our main result is robust: A firm announcing its contract
earlier chooses a contract design which induces more aggressive behavior in
the market stage. Again profits are higher the earlier a firm commits to its
incentive contract: Πˆ1 > Πˆ2 > Πˆ3.
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2.2.5 Relative Performance Contracts
Until now we have focused on profit-sales contracts. Whereas in strategic
management and marketing relative market share is often used as an indi-
cator for the market position of a company. Therefore, it is reasonable to
compensate managers through a relative comparison of performance figures.
Especially in the duopoly case, in which the direct competition is distinct,
relative performance contracts for managers are worthy of consideration.
Here, we turn our attention to the class of relative performance contracts,
in which manager compensation depends on own profits and competitor’s
profits:
gi = Πi + αiΠj , (2.18)
where αi ∈ [−1, 0] is a weight on competitor’s profits.
We follow the same steps as in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. Given incentive
contracts characterized by α1 and α2, the outcome in the market stage is
given by
qi =
(1− αi)(1− c)
3− αi − αj − αiαj , (2.19)
leading to profits of
Πi =
(1− αi)(1− αiαj)(1− c)2
(3− αi − αj − αiαj)2 . (2.20)
Simultaneous Contracting
In the case of simultaneous contracting, both firm owners choose simul-
taneously the contract parameters α1 and α2 as to maximize Eq.(2.20).
There exists a symmetric equilibrium in which both firm owners choose
α¯1 = α¯2 = −13 . This leads to firm profits of Π¯ = 332(1− c)2.
Sequential Contracting
In the case of sequential contracting, in the second stage of the game firm 2
chooses its incentive parameter α2 for given choice by firm 1:
α2 =
α1 + 1
3α1 − 1 . (2.21)
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Anticipating the choice of firm 2, profits of firm 1 at the relevant stage can
be expressed as:
Π1 =
(1− 3α1)(1− c)2
16(1− α1) . (2.22)
This expression strictly decreases in α1. Hence, the owner of firm 1 chooses
the minimum value possible, that is, α∗1 = −1. Plugging into the choice
function by firm 2 gives, α∗2 = 0. That is the leader chooses to be a relative
profit maximizer, and the follower chooses to be a pure profit maximizer.
The leader then earns profits of Π∗1 =
2
16(1−c)2 and the follower earns profits
of Π∗2 =
1
16(1− c)2. That is Π∗1 = 2Π∗2.
The main result of the case with profit-sales contracts survives: Compared to
simultaneous contracting, with sequential contracting the leader chooses the
more aggressive contract, offers a larger quantity, and earns higher profits.
In general, firms do always earn higher profits when relative performance
contracts are employed than compared to the case with profit-sales contracts.
That is under simultaneous (sequential) contracting firms own higher profits
when relative performance contracts are employed. However, it should be
noticed that the advantage of the leader is larger when relative performance
contracts are employed. Here, the leader earns twice as much as the follower
compared to 1.5 as much in the case of profit-sales contracts.
2.2.6 Conclusion
The aim of this section is to study sequential contracting in a delegation
game with Cournot competition. Firms may engage in sequential contract-
ing if one has some sort of advantage enabling it to move first. We show that
optimal contracts are asymmetric. The leader puts more weight on sales or
relative profits in the contract proposed to its manager. Hence, he chooses
a contract that induces more aggressive behavior in the market stage. This
leads to an asymmetric oligopoly outcome with the leader at the contract-
ing stage earning higher profits than the follower. Contracting first gives a
strategic advantage.
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2.3 Delegation in Tullock Contests
2.3.1 Introduction
Competition can often be better characterized by a contest model. Contest
in the basic form means the expenditure of resources in order to influence
the allocation of a fixed demand of a certain product. Dixit (1987) ana-
lyzes strategic behavior in contests and conveys the results to the case of
oligopolistic competition for a homogeneous product with unit-elastic de-
mand, where firms compete for total market revenue V by choosing dif-
ferent market shares. Furthermore, he mentions rent-seeking as another
application of delegation in the contest model. There the awarded prize is
for example a contract or an important license and the expended effort is
wasted from a social welfare viewpoint. In an analogous manner it is valid
for a more natural setting, patent races.
Specifically, delegation in the context of Tullock contests, as we consider
here, is analyzed in Baik and Kim (1997), Baik (2007), Wa¨rneryd (2000),
Kra¨kel (2002) and Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2006). Closest to our research are
the last two, but in contrast to us they analyze linear incentive schemes
for managers based on sales and profits, Kra¨kel (2002) for two players and
Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2006) for the n players case. Whereas, we concentrate
on relative performance contracts in this section.
The chapter proceed as follows. In Section 2.3.2, we outline a model setup
with relative performance contracts and study shortly the results of the
benchmark case of no delegation. In Section 2.3.3, we analyze the outcome
under simultaneous contracting. If we have more than two firms in the
market, there will exist a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which is sym-
metric and different from the equilibrium without delegation. Afterwards, in
Section 2.3.4 we give an outlook on the results in the sequential contracting
case. In Section 2.3.5, we conclude.
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2.3.2 The Model
Model Setup
We consider a market with n ≥ 3 risk neutral firms. The number of firms is
exogenously given. Those n firms compete in a contest through expending
effort for a common prize V > 0. Firm owners do not decide on contest effort
directly. They have a shortage of time due to many other duties, so that they
have to delegate this decision to a manager. Delegation is exogenous in the
model and happens on a first, namely the contract stage of the game. The
firm owners influence the managers behavior in the contest by designing an
incentive contract based on relative market performance at the first stage.
An alternative interpretation of this contract stage, which would not change
the analysis and the results, would be that there are managers with differ-
ent intrinsic preferences. Firm owners can observe these exogenously given
preferences and choose one manager out of this group. There are enough
managers, so that each firm owner can freely choose. Hence, the contract
stage would be to choose delegates with the desirable corresponding prefer-
ence.
After the contract stage follows a second stage, the contest stage, in which
the n duly accredited managers, one delegate per firm, decide about the
effort to spend in the contest. The contest is an imperfectly discriminating
rent-seeking contest for the rent V . In such an imperfectly discriminating
contest it is not guaranteed that the highest effort wins. This feature is cap-
tured by the following contest success function (CSF) proposed by Tullock
(1980)
pi(x1, . . . , xn) =
xi∑n
j=1 xj
,
where xi is the effort spend by the manager of firm i.
Consequently, the profit to the owner of firm i is
Πi(x1, . . . , xn) =
xi∑n
j=1 xj
V − xi. (2.23)
Managers choose their effort in order to maximize their utility. The util-
ity function arises from the designed contract with the firm owners. As in
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and the previous section, the manager’s com-
pensation consists of two parts and is given by ai + bigi, where bi > 0.
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The first part ai is performance independent and bigi is the performance
dependent part of the contract, which is chosen by the owners. ai and bi
are chosen by owner i so that the manager’s compensation just equals his
reservation value. It is further assumed that this reservation value is zero so
that it will always pay for an owner to delegate the decision. Unlike existing
models we assume that owners offer delegates a contract based on relative
performance evaluation:
gi(x1, . . . , xn) = Πi + αi
∑n
j=1 Πj
n
, (2.24)
where αi ∈ [−1, 1]. The parameter αi is the weight put on average industry
profits. We assume −1 ≤ αi ≤ 1 to ensure that the utility of each manager
depends stronger on the payoff of the own firm than on the average industry
payoff. Managers with a contract with αi ∈ [−1, 0[ do not only care about
their own firms material payoff, they care more about the firm’s material
payoff compared to the average material payoff of all active firms in the
market. The contract induces managers to behave as if they have negatively
interdependent preferences. Their utility increases with own material success
and decreases with the material success of competitors. Therefore, they are
envious. The degree of enviousness depends on the chosen weight αi in the
contract. When αi = 0, this corresponds to pure profit maximization, and
hence no delegation. Managers with a contract weight of αi ∈ ]0, 1] behave
like altruists. They are concerned with the profit of the other firms.
Delegates attempt to maximize income from this incentive contract. The
contract is a linear combination of own profits and average industry profits.
We call the resulting preference interdependent, because it depends beside
the own payoff on the rivals’ payoffs. Substituting Eq.(2.23) into Eq.(2.24)
the contract can be expressed as:
gi(x1, . . . , xn) =
xi∑n
j=1 xj
V − xi + αi
n
V − n∑
j=1
xj
 . (2.25)
Summarizing, we consider the following game. In the first stage, the con-
tract stage, firms decide simultaneously on the incentive contracts for their
delegates and announce them publicly. In the second stage, the contest, the
delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously. We look for a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the game.
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Benchmark without Delegation
To filter out the impact of delegation, we briefly report the results of the
model without delegation. The game without the contract stage would result
in a standard one-stage Tullock contest with the absolute payoff maximizing
firm owners as a homogeneous players field. This reduced game results in a
symmetric Nash-equilibrium in which each contestant expends x∗i =
n−1
n2
V
effort and earns Π∗i =
1
n2
V expected payoff. The participation condition,
that each contestant has a positive expected payoff, is fulfilled and all po-
tential players take part in the contest. Hence, the aggregate effort in the
contest is given by n−1n V and therewith the ratio between aggregated ef-
fort and rent, the rent dissipation, by RD =
∑
x∗i
V =
n−1
n . From a welfare
point of view these efforts are unproductive waste in the framework of rent-
seeking. The arising question now is whether delegation leads to the same
or to another equilibrium.
2.3.3 Simultaneous Contracting
We solve the two-stage game using the technique of backward induction.
Therefore, we start the analysis with the second, the contest stage.
Contest Stage
In the contest stage, we have to consider that players can be heterogeneous
due to different incentive contracts negotiated in the contract stage. We
sort the field of players via the weight put on average industry profits in
their contracts α1 ≤ α2 ≤ · · · ≤ αn that are endogenously determined in
the first stage. To obtain a pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution for this
contest we follow and extend the framework of Stein (2002). He investigates
the properties of a single stage n players rent-seeking contest with different
valuations and/or different abilities among the players and obtains a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium solution. We modify this framework by introduc-
ing heterogeneity due to different incentive contracts. Different incentive
contracts mean, that the underlying contest success function and the value
of the rent are still the same for all players but they have diverse utility
functions.
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It is possible to characterize the form of the resulting effort vector in the
equilibrium (x∗1 . . . , x∗n). In this rent-seeking contest we may claim that there
are n potential players, but there is no reason to assume that all will make
positive expenditures. Therefore, assume that the number of active players
is k ≤ n, k ∈ N. Since the expected payoff of player i is concave in xi for all
αi ∈ [−1, 1], it is optimal for a player to use an interior point solution if one
exists. Guse (2006) shows that the participation problem in a contest with
interdependent preferences of this type can be translated in an incentive
problem with heterogeneous rent valuations but independent preferences.
According to Guse (2006) and Fang (2002) a player in a contest with het-
erogeneous valuations kk+αiV will only exert positive effort in equilibrium if
the aggregate effort of all active players does not exceed the own valuation.
That is
k
k + αi
V >
k∑
j=1
xj . (2.26)
Hence, assume k ≤ n as the largest number for which this condition holds.
Players with small values of αi, meaning more spiteful players, will make
positive expenditures whereas those with sufficiently high values will choose
to make no expenditure and thus will not be part of the contest. The con-
dition depends on the equilibrium efforts. After finding the equilibrium we
can state this participation condition only in dependence to the preference
parameter.
To simplify the analysis we introduce now the following auxiliary-parameter
λi =
k + αi
k
.
From αi ∈ [−1, 1] it follows that λi ∈
[
1− 1k , 1 + 1k
] ⊆ [12 , 32]. Note that the
most spiteful player who has the smallest αi is assigned to the smallest λi
value. Hence, the transformation of αi to λi is just an adjustment of the
intervals. From α1 ≤ · · · ≤ αk it follows that λ1 ≤ · · · ≤ λk.
In the contest stage of the game, delegates decide on effort expended in the
contest. They try to maximize their income out of the incentive contract
which they got in the first stage. Therefore, the first-order condition of
player i for the incentive Eq.(2.25) is
∂gi
∂xi
=
∑
j≤k xj − xi
(
∑
j≤k xj)2
V − 1− αi
k
. (2.27)
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It can be verified that the expected payoff and therewith the utility is concave
in each xi. Then,
∂gi
∂xi
!
= 0 implies that for any xi > 0:
xi =
∑
j≤k
xj −
(
∑
j≤k xj)
2λi
V
(2.28)
This equation states that the xi with xi > 0 are ordered in the opposite way
as the λi; x
∗
1 ≥ x∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ x∗k > 0 for some index k and x∗i = 0 for i > k.
Now sum (2.28) over all i = 1, . . . , k and solve:
∑
i≤k
xi =
∑
i≤k
∑
j≤k
xj −
(
∑
j≤k xj)
2λi
V

⇔
∑
i≤k
xi =
∑
j≤k
xj
[
k − (
∑
j≤k xj)
∑
i≤k λi
V
]
⇔ 1 = k − (
∑
j≤k xj)
∑
i≤k λi
V
⇔
∑
i≤k
xi =
(k − 1)V∑
i≤k λi
⇔
∑
i≤k
xi =
k − 1
k
V Γk (2.29)
where Γk =
[
1
k
∑
i≤k λi
]−1
is the inverse of the arithmetic mean of the first
k values of λi or in other words the harmonic mean of the first k values of
the sequence ( 1λi ).
Equation (2.29) can be used with (2.28) in order to yield an expression for
the equilibrium strategy for player i for all i ≤ k:
x∗i =
k − 1
k
V Γk
[
1− (k − 1)Γkλi
k
]
(2.30)
Given the optimal effort levels we can develop the participation condition
depending on the preference parameter. Player i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is active, if:
x∗i > 0 ⇔ λi <
∑
j≤k λj
k − 1 (2.31)
From (2.30) we can also compute the probability that player i, i ≤ k, wins
the contest:
pi =
xi∑
xj
= 1− (k − 1)Γkλi
k
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Since 0 < λ1 ≤ · · · ≤ λk it follows that p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pk > 0. Player i is said
to be more successful than player j if pi > pj .
The rent dissipation (RD), the total expenditures by all the players divided
by the rent V , is given by
RD =
k − 1
k
Γk.
The rent dissipation depends on the harmonic mean of the sequence ( 1λi ).
If one of the preference parameter λi is increased and another one λj is
decreased by the same amount, then the rent dissipation does not change as
long as the number of participating players, k, is unaffected.
By direct computation, ∂RD∂λi = − k−1(∑λi)2 < 0 and ∂2RD∂λ2i = 2(k−1)(∑λi)3 > 0.
Assuming k is not affected, this leads to the following result:
Result 2.3 The rent dissipation decreases with an increase in λi resp. in
αi.
An increase in the preference parameter means that player i has got a less
spiteful contract in the first stage. If a player acts less spiteful it implies
that he expends less effort and therewith the rent dissipation decreases.
Example Assume a contest with n = 3 and V = 1, where the players are
characterized by λ1 =
2
3 , λ2 =
5
6 and λ3 = 1. In competitive equilibrium
they will choose x∗1 =
28
75 ≈ 0.373, x∗2 = 415 ≈ 0.267 and x∗3 = 425 = 0.16,
resulting in a rent dissipation of RD = 45 . Now, increase the preference
parameter for one player, e.g. for the second player by assuming λ2 = 1. In
competitive equilibrium the new set of players will choose x˜∗1 =
3
8 = 0.375,
x˜∗2 =
3
16 = 0.1875 and x˜
∗
3 =
3
16 = 0.1875, resulting in a rent dissipation of
R˜D = 34 . The rent dissipation in the latter setting is smaller than in the
former as Result 2.3 states.
Contract Stage
Giving the optimal behavior of the managers in the second stage we can
analyze the optimal relative performance contracts between firm owners and
managers on the first stage. Firm owners choose the contract such that they
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maximize indirectly their profit. Given the chosen effort on the second stage
the payoff of the firm owners is given by
Πi =
[
1− (k−1)Γkλik
]
∑
j≤k
[
1− (k−1)Γkλjk
]V − k − 1
k
V Γk
[
1− (k − 1)Γkλi
k
]
. (2.32)
The first-order condition of the maximization of Eq.(2.32) with respect to
the auxiliary contract parameter λi is given by:
∂Πi
∂λi
= −(k−1)V
[∑
λj − (λi + 1)
(
∑
λj)2
]
+(k−1)2V (
∑
λj)
2 − 2λi
∑
λj
(
∑
λj)4
(2.33)
Solving (2.33) under the assumption of symmetric, rational behavior of the
firm owners we get
λ∗ =
k2 − 2k + 2
k(k − 1) . (2.34)
Now, reversion of the substitution of λi =
k+αi
k leads to the following result.
Result 2.4 The optimal incentive contract satisfies α∗ = −k−2k−1 for k ≥ 2.
Result 2.4 states that the optimal incentive contract depends on the number
of contestants.4 For k ≥ 3 the optimal contract puts negative weight on the
rival’s payoff and creates always spiteful, aggressive behavior. For k = 2 we
get a multiplicity of equilibria. All equilibria fulfill the following condition:
α1 = −α2. Since we restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria there exist
only one equilibrium for k = 2 that satisfies the symmetric condition, namely
α1 = α2 = 0.
5 This means that in two-player contests the optimal delegation
involves giving the manager an independent profit maximizing contract. As
Possajennikov (2008) shows the incentive for delegation depends on the slope
of the reaction function at equilibrium. He explains that if the slope of the
reaction function is zero, a change in the strategy does not have a first-order
effect on the rival’s strategy. This means that delegation with αi 6= 0 cannot
be beneficial as this will lead to a change in own action to which the rival
will not react.
4We are aware of the restriction that the number of contestants, k, can possibly change
with the chosen αi in this stage. For that we go back afterwards and show, that under
the chosen optimal αi always all n players take part in the contest.
5See Kra¨kel (2002) for the problem within the field of delegation in contests with two
players. He analyzes in contrast to our framework contracts based on sales and payoffs.
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Associated with the equilibrium preference parameter α∗ equilibrium efforts
are:
x∗i =
(k − 1)2
k(k2 − 2k + 2)V, (2.35)
and the corresponding equilibrium profits
Π∗i =
V
k(k2 − 2k + 2) . (2.36)
Interestingly, equilibrium effort and profits coincide with those from incen-
tive contracts which are a linear combination of profits and sales as shown
by Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2006). They choose a contract with a linear com-
bination of profits and sales gˆi = λiΠi + (1 − λi)Si, where Si = xi∑xj S are
the sales of firm i and S is the total market volume. Restating our relative
performance contract leads to gi = λiΠi+(1−λi)Si−(1−λi)(S−
∑
j 6=i xj) =
gˆi − (1 − λi)(S −
∑
j 6=i xj). Since the second term in the contract is inde-
pendent of xi both contracts lead to the same first-order conditions in the
contest stage ∂gi∂xi =
∂gˆi
∂xi
=
∑
xj−xi
(
∑
xj)2
V − λi and therewith to the same equi-
librium effort and profits. Hence, the result by Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2006)
that all owners together are worse off in case of delegation compared to non-
delegation is assignable to our setting. Lower profits in the delegation game
coincide with a higher rent dissipation, which we analyze next.
As we have seen, in the case of simultaneous contracting all managers get the
same incentive contract on the first stage and therewith are equal spiteful
on the second stage. Giving this symmetric equilibrium the participation
condition (2.26) is always fulfilled and all potential players take part in the
contest, which means k = n. Hence, the rent dissipation in the simultaneous
contracting game amounts to
RDdel =
(n− 1)2
(n2 − 2n+ 2) .
Result 2.5 The rent dissipation with simultaneous delegation is strictly
higher for n > 2 or equal for n = 2 than the rent dissipation without delega-
tion.
Proof.
(n− 1)2
(n2 − 2n+ 2) ≥
(n− 1)
n
⇔ n ≥ 2
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This condition is always fulfilled since we assume n ≥ 2 in our calculations.
Given the finding that all potential players take part in the contest, it is
worthwhile to examine the contract when the number of contestants becomes
large. An increase in the number of participants results in a decreasing
contract parameter α∗. The limit case is given in the following result:
Result 2.6 As n→∞: α∗ → −1 and therewith gi → Πi.
Proof. Since
∑n
j=1 Πj ≤ V is bounded it follows
lim
n→∞ gi = limn→∞
(
Πi +
αi
n
∑
Πj
)
= lim
n→∞Πi + limn→∞
αi
n
∑
Πj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
.
This result states that the optimal contract parameter α∗ approaches −1 as
the number of competitors in the contest goes toward infinity. With unlim-
ited number of contest participants owners choose pure payoff maximizing
contracts because the interdependent part in the contract, the average of
all payoffs, goes toward zero. Our finding is in line to Kra¨kel and Sliwka
(2006). They consider the same basic setup as ours but study profit-sales
contracts. Their finding is that an unlimited number of competitors induces
firm owners to choose pure profit contracts for their managers.
2.3.4 Sequential Contracting
Until now we have focused on simultaneous contracting, that is, all firm
owners announce their incentive contracts at the same time. This section
studies the changes when firm owners announce contracts sequentially. First,
we analyze the situation when there is one first mover who can commit to
an action and then all other choose simultaneously their action. Second, one
firm can commit to a contract before the second firm can do so, the second
firm can do before the third one can do, and so forth.
It is hard to get an analytical solution, hence we provide numerical results
up to five players. We determine by computation the subgame perfect equi-
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libria.6 Constructing the optimally chosen contract weights and resultant
payoffs for the case of a Stackelberg leader and simultaneous committing
followers gives us the following Table 2.1:
α1
(Π1/V )
α2
(Π2/V )
α3
(Π3/V )
α4
(Π4/V )
α5
(Π5/V )
n = 3
−1
(0.0799)
−0.3542
(0.0486)
−0.3542
(0.0486)
n = 4
−1
(0.0295)
−0.5925
(0.0209)
−0.5925
(0.0209)
−0.5925
(0.0209)
n = 5
−1
(0.0137)
−0.7039
(0.0105)
−0.7039
(0.0105)
−0.7039
(0.0105)
−0.7039
(0.0105)
Table 2.1: Sequential contracting: Stackelberg leader, homogeneous follow-
ers
The table indicates that the first moving firm owner choses the most spiteful
and therewith the most aggressive contract that is possible in this frame-
work. This is a boundary result since the weight put on average industry
profits α is restricted to the interval [−1, 1]. If the restriction did not exist
the first moving firm would choose an even more aggressive contract. The
most spiteful contract goes along with the highest payoffs. Comparing the
payoffs with those of the simultaneous contracting shows that there exists
a strategic first mover advantage for owners when choosing their incentive
schemes first. The Stackelberg leader can gain from sequential contracting
whereas all other firms lose.7 As the number of followers increases the equi-
librium approaches the same solution in which all firm owners chose α = −1
as the simultaneous contracting equilibrium (Result 2.6).
6The numerical results presented here are computed with Maple. The analysis uses
the backward induction technique and therefore started with the second stage, the contest
stage analysis. The optimal equilibrium effort and the profits of the firm owners, depending
just on the chosen weights of competitor’s profits (αi, i = 1, . . . , n), were conducted. Given
the first order conditions for the optimal profit we computed the best response of the
homogeneous followers and of the Stackelberg leader given the knowledge of the best
responses of the followers. Having found on this way the optimal chosen weight of the
first mover we solved forward for the weights of later moving firm owners in equilibrium.
7This result is generally proved for commitment in symmetric contests by Possajennikov
(2009).
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Result 2.7 When incentive contracts are chosen first by the Stackelberg
leader and then simultaneously by all other competing firm owners
i) the leader puts more negative weight on the average market payoff and
earns higher profits than the followers and
ii) the Stackelberg leader earns higher profits than in the completely si-
multaneous setting.
In Table 2.2 there are in extracts the results calculated by computation for
the optimally sequentially chosen contract weights and the resultant payoffs
in the subgame perfect equilibrium when all firms commit sequentially to
their actions.8
α1
(Π1/V )
α2
(Π2/V )
α3
(Π3/V )
α4
(Π4/V )
α5
(Π5/V )
n = 3
−1
(0.0609)
−0.8066
(0.0531)
−0.1980
(0.0283)
n = 4
−1
(0.0188)
−1
(0.0188)
−0.8423
(0.0165)
−0.3480
(0.0091)
n = 5
−1
(0.0079)
−1
(0.0079)
−1
(0.0079)
−0.8775
(0.0071)
−0.4012
(0.0039)
Table 2.2: Sequential contracting: leader, heterogeneous followers
Table (2.2) indicates that all owners choose equal or even stronger aggressive
contracts than in the scenario before and therewith earn less expected payoff
in the contest. The earlier moving firm owners chose the most spiteful and
therewith the most aggressive contract that is possible in this framework.
This is a boundary result since the weight put on average industry profits
α is restricted to the interval [−1, 1]. If the restriction did not exist the
earlier moving firms would choose an even more aggressive contract. The
8The numerical results presented here are computed with Maple. The analysis uses
the backward induction technique and therefore started with the second stage, the contest
stage analysis. The optimal equilibrium effort and the profits of the firm owners, depending
just on the chosen weights of competitor’s profits (αi, i = 1, . . . , n), were conducted. Given
the first order conditions for the optimal profit we computed the best response of the last
moving firm owner until the first moving one, given the knowledge of all best responses
of later moving owners. Having found on this way the optimal chosen weight of the first
mover we solved forward for the weights of later moving firm owners in equilibrium.
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expected payoff falls for all firm owners below the equilibrium payoff in a
completely symmetric game. In this scenario none can gain from committing
sequentially. The spitefulness decreases with each position in the rank order
of announcing the contract. This means that the later moving firms earn
less expected payoff in the contest than the earlier moving. In the end, all
the firm owners earn a positive payoff. That is the reason why all of them
take part in this game under the assumption that delegation is exogenous.
Again, as the number of followers increases the equilibrium approaches the
same solution in which all firm owners chose α = −1 as the simultaneous
contracting equilibrium and even faster as in the former Stackelberg setting.
Result 2.8 When incentive contracts are chosen first by the leader and then
sequentially by all other competing firm owners
i) the earlier committing owners put more negative weight on the aver-
age market payoff in the subgame perfect equilibrium and earn higher
profits than the later ones and
ii) all owners earn lower profits than in the completely simultaneous set-
ting.
2.3.5 Conclusion
The aim of this section is to study delegation in advance to a Tullock contest.
Firm owners delegate the decision of how much to spend in the contest to a
manager. Managers are employed through a relative performance contract
which the firm owner can determine. We show that optimal contracts in
the simultaneous contracting case have a weight on the relative standing
component and do not maximize pure payoffs. Therefore, the players in the
contest are envious and spiteful. As the number of players increases the
spitefulness increases. Spitefulness induces more aggressive behavior and
therewith more expended effort in the contest stage. The rent dissipation is
higher in the case of delegation.
Focusing on sequential contracting in a delegation game, we find that op-
timal contracts are asymmetric. The leader puts more weight on relative
profits in the contract proposed to its manager. Hence, he chooses a con-
tract that induces more aggressive behavior in the contest stage. This leads
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to an asymmetric oligopoly outcome with the leader at the contracting stage
earning higher profits than the follower.
2.4 Conclusion
As we have seen in this chapter, it is possible to create spiteful behavior
or in other words to generate negatively interdependent preferences in a
competition through a two-stage game. Competition can mean Cournot
competition or contests. In the case of simultaneous contracting the games
have a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all participants exhibit spite-
ful aggressive behavior. To convey this feature in the framework of other
regarding preferences, we would say all participants have the same degree
of negatively interdependent preferences. To create a heterogeneous player
field we study sequential contracting in a delegation game with Cournot
competition as well as with contests. Due to the time structure the opti-
mal chosen contracts are different for players in both situations. The leader
puts more weight on relative profits in the contract proposed to its man-
ager. Hence, he chooses a contract that induces more aggressive behavior
in the market stage. This leads to an asymmetric oligopoly outcome with
the leader at the contracting stage earning higher profits than the follower.
Contracting first gives a strategic advantage comparable with the strate-
gic advantage arising through negatively interdependent preferences in an
evolutionary framework.
Chapter 3
Rent-Seeking Contests of
Heterogeneous Players with
Interdependent Preferences
3.1 Introduction
There is a already large and still growing literature on the theory and ap-
plication of contests. A contest is a game where all players simultaneously
exert effort, and only one of them wins a prize, while the others get nothing.
Effort determines the players’ chance of winning the prize. Some promi-
nent examples of contests in the every day life are R&D and patent races or
lobbying.
One special field of the contest literature is the area of rent-seeking.1 Rent-
seeking generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from players
without making any contribution to productivity. For example it is held to
be associated with efforts to cause a redistribution of wealth by shifting the
government tax burden or government spending allocation. In this chapter
we explore rent-seeking contests, where the set of players is heterogeneous, as
Stein (2002), Cornes and Hartley (2005) and Ryvkin (2007) did. In contrast
to them we focus on heterogeneity concerning the preferences of the play-
1For surveys about rent-seeking see Nitzan (1994), Tollison (1997), Konrad (2007) or
Corchon (2007).
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ers. Persistent experimental findings in game theory2 suggest that players
assess their well-being not entirely in terms of their absolute payoff; some
weight is put on relative payoffs. That means that the players in reality
have positively or negatively interdependent preferences. In our analysis we
focus on the envious characteristic of persons. Therefore, the players have
negatively interdependent preferences in different parameter values. Specif-
ically, all players are status seekers whose preferences differ with respect to
spitefulness.
For a long time the assumption of preferences being independent from the
other players’ payoff has been unquestioned in economics. In the more re-
cent literature, especially the literature about evolutionary game theory,
it became more common to relax this assumption of purely self-interested
preferences. Leininger (2003) and Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov
(2004) with an evolutionary approach at the level of strategies and Leininger
(2009) with an evolutionary approach at the level of preferences show that
in rent-seeking contests, as analyzed here, it is evolutionarily stable to be-
have like a player with interdependent preferences in Nash equilibrium would
behave.
Nevertheless, the idea of interdependent preferences is rather old. One of the
first findings of aspiration for relative success can be found in Veblen (1899).
Much later Duesenberry (1949) laid a first empirical basis for interdependent
preferences. More recent empirical support of the interdependent preference
hypothesis is given by Bush (1994a,b) and Kapteyn, van der Geer, van de
Stadt, and Wansbeck (1997), who used field data. Furthermore, Levine
(1998) and Davis and Holt (1993) give support for the economic relevance
of interdependent preferences based on experimental data. Moreover, our
experience in the daily business strongly suggest interdependent preferences
to be present in the real world. For example people regard colleagues in the
job with envy as well as teammates in leisure time sports.
Therefore, we assume players to have interdependent preferences and study
the structure of the equilibria that emerge in those rent-seeking contests.
We analyze whether the equilibria should be symmetric or not. We stress
the importance of the exact preferences in order to understand the impact
of the technology of rent-seeking on the outcome of the game. In the case
2See for example Levine (1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) or Zizzo and Oswald
(2000).
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of a constant returns to scale technology we explore asymmetric equilibria.
In addition, we approximate asymmetric equilibria for arbitrary technology
parameters when preference heterogeneity is weak. The question studied is
whether weak heterogeneity of players due to different preferences is capa-
ble of causing significant changes in the equilibrium structure. A second
question is which influence the chosen technology has on the number of ac-
tive players in a rent-seeking contest. Therefore, we calculate the threshold
values of the discriminatory power for which players sequentially drop out.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the general setup of
the rent-seeking contest. In Section 3.3, we analyze the benchmark case with
homogeneous players with negatively interdependent preferences and explore
the condition for an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, in Section 3.4, we
turn to heterogeneous players and examine the Nash equilibria for the case
of a constant returns to scale technology. To approximate equilibria in the
case of an increasing returns to scale technology with all players participating
(Section 3.5) and with less than all players participating (Section 3.6), we
restrict players to be weakly heterogeneous concerning their preferences. We
demonstrate the results in an numerical example in Section 3.7 and, finally,
in Section 3.8, we conclude.
3.2 General Setup of the Contest
The general setup consists of an imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking con-
test for the common rent V > 0. n risk neutral players, denoted by the
elements of the set N = {1, . . . , n}, potentially take part in the contest.
The number of players n ≥ 2 is exogenously given and fixed. A fixed num-
ber of players n is reasonable for situations where the group of participants
is restricted for example through specific characteristics or informational
advantages.
The contest, which will be analyzed, is a one-stage contest, which means
that players expend simultaneous efforts xi ≥ 0. We call player i active in
the contest if his effort is positive (xi > 0), otherwise (xi = 0) we say that
player i has dropped out of the contest. Then, the subset of active players
K = {1, . . . , k} ⊆ N is defined. In an imperfectly discriminating contest it
is not guaranteed that the highest effort wins. This feature is captured by
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the following contest success function (CSF) which is proposed by Tullock
(1980)
pi(x1, . . . , xn) =

xri∑n
j=1 x
r
j
if max{x1, . . . , xn} > 0
1/n otherwise
(3.1)
where 0 ≤ r ≤ 2 is the technology parameter. This technology parameter
r represents the efficiency of the given contest technology. r is also called
the discriminatory power of the contest, because it determines how much
impact a player’s own effort has on his winning probability. We restrict r
to the interval [0, 2] because for r > 2 the existence of equilibria in pure
strategies is not guaranteed as Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) found
out. In the following sections the interval is readjusted for the applying
framework. Among other things the dependence of the equilibrium structure
on different levels of discriminatory power is analyzed in this chapter.
Players of the contest gain expected material payoff which depends on their
own effort and the efforts of their active competitors. The dependency is
captured in the following material payoff function, which determines the
material success of player i:
Πi(x1, . . . , xn) =
xri∑n
j=1 x
r
j
V − xi. (3.2)
Players choose their effort in order to maximize their utility. They have
negatively interdependent preferences. For simplification, we assume that
their utility function is linear in their own and in the average material payoff
of active players.
Fi(x1, . . . , xn) = Πi + αi
1
n
n∑
j=1
Πj (3.3)
where −1 < αi ≤ 0 is the preference parameter. Players not only care
about their own payoff, they rather care about their payoff compared to the
average payoff of all active players. Their utility increases with own material
success and decreases with the material success of competitors. In addition
we assume αi > −1 to ensure that the utility of each player depends stronger
on his own payoff than on the average payoff. Let the preference parameter
α1, . . . , αn for convenience be ordered so that α1 ≤ α2 ≤ · · · ≤ αn. Hence,
the players are ordered by their preferences: player 1 has the most spiteful
preference and player n acts least spiteful.
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3.3 The Case of Identical Players
This section summarizes the analysis of the Tullock contest with identical
players. Especially the main results, adopted to our particular setting, of
the model presented in Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Ryvkin (2007)
and Guse and Hehenkamp (2006) are repeated, compared and extended for
players with interdependent preferences.
Assume that all players have identical negatively interdependent or indepen-
dent preferences (α1 = · · · = αn = α) and that all n potentially interested
players participate in the contest. The number of players n is exogenously
given and fixed during the contest. In the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game among identical players effort levels have to solve the following first-
order conditions:
∂
∂xi
(
xri∑
xrj
)
=
1 + αn
V
. (3.4)
Searching for symmetric equilibria in which n players participate we substi-
tute
∑n
j=1 x
r
j = nx
r in the above first-order conditions and get the equilib-
rium levels: The optimal effort level is given by
x∗(n) =
(n− 1)
n2
rV
1
(1 + αn )
. (3.5)
If we assume players to be identical the effort level of players with interde-
pendent preferences (α < 0) is higher than the effort level in a game among
players with independent preferences (α = 0).
Using the optimal effort level, Eq.(3.5), we can calculate the material payoff
in the equilibrium
Π∗(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) =
1
n
V − x∗(n) = V
n
(
1− r(n− 1)
n
1
(1 + αn )
)
(3.6)
and the utility
F ∗(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) = (1 + α)Π
∗(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n). (3.7)
The material payoff as well as the utility is smaller for players with interde-
pendent preferences due to the higher effort they spend.
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Now, we relax the assumption that all n players participate in the contest.
The number of active players depends on the technology parameter r holding
all other factors constant. For those asymmetric equilibria we derive the
upper threshold values of the technology parameter for which k active players
scrape through. First, we characterize a Nash equilibrium with k active
players out of n (K ⊆ N ). In such an equilibrium all active players spend
the same effort in rent-seeking.3
x∗(k) =
(k − 1)
k2
rV
1
(1 + αk )
(3.8)
Second, we derive general conditions under which players participate in the
contest and under which they stay out of the contest. Player i participates in
the contest whenever this gives him a higher utility than non-participation
would give. In contrast to players with independent preferences, who get
zero utility for non-participating in the contest, players with negatively inter-
dependent preferences evaluate their relative payoff that would result from
non-participation. Being inactive as a player corresponds to zero effort, zero
material payoff and a negative utility. For a given discriminatory power r of
the contest success function the participation condition (PC) is given by :
∀i ∈ K : Fi(x∗(k)) ≥ Fi(0, x∗−i(k − 1))
⇔ (1 + α)
(
V
k
− x∗(k)
)
≥ α
(
V
k − 1 − x
∗(k − 1)
)
⇔ (k + α)(k − 1− α)(k − 1 + α)
(k − 1)3 + α(k + α) ≥ r. (3.9)
No player in the active subset K has an incentive to drop out as long as these
inequalities hold. Participating with the optimal effort in an equilibrium
with k players has a higher utility for the players than not being actively
involved in a (k − 1) players contest, meaning player i choses zero effort
whereas the other k− 1 players chose their optimal equilibrium effort. This
condition, Eq.(3.9), gives the upper bound on r for the existence of an
intermediate equilibrium with k active players.
rmax(k) = max
{
r|∀i ∈ K : Fi(x∗(k)) ≥ Fi(0, x∗−i(k − 1))
}
(3.10)
It is interesting to see that the number of active players k does not depend on
the number of potential players n. It only depends on two exogenously given
3See Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) for the prove of the case with independent
preferences.
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Figure 3.1: Maximum levels of discriminatory power r for α.
values, on the preference parameter α and on the technology parameter r of
the contest.
Result 3.1 In the case of identical players with interdependent preferences
the discriminatory power r has to fulfill the following condition to secure the
existence of an equilibrium with k active players:
r ≤ rmax(k) = (k + α)(k − 1− α)(k − 1 + α)
(k − 1)3 + α(k + α) .
Proof. See calculation of Eq.(3.9).
In the case where the technology of rent-seeking shows constant or decreasing
returns to scale (r ≤ 1), for a fixed number of players the above derived
condition is always fulfilled and therefore there is a unique Nash equilibrium
which is symmetric. In this equilibrium all n players participate in the
rent-seeking process since the participation condition (Eq.(3.9)) is fulfilled.
In the case of increasing returns to scale, if the number of possible players
is not too high, the condition is not binding. Again, there is a unique
49 CHAPTER 3. INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES
symmetric equilibrium with all players participating actively in the contest.
However, when the number of players potentially interested in the contest
is higher than a certain level and thereby the condition for the technology
parameter is binding, we find a multiplicity of equilibria. Those equilibria
are asymmetric; there are k players devoting the same amount of effort and
n − k staying inactive. The reason for the multiplicity of equilibria is the
indeterminacy of who will be the active players and who the inactive ones.
By computation we prove that the partial derivative of the maximal tech-
nology parameter with respect to the preference parameter is positive inde-
pendent of the number of actively players (∂rmax∂α > 0). rmax decreases for
decreasing values of the preference parameter α. Hence, the upper bound for
the technology parameter r to secure the existence of an asymmetric Nash
equilibrium with k active players is lower for a contest of players with neg-
atively interdependent preferences than for independent preferences. This
finding creates the following result:
Result 3.2 For the same technology parameter r the set of active players
under the assumption of negatively interdependent preferences is smaller or
equal than the set of active players under the assumption of independent
preferences.
However, for higher values of the technology parameter r, competition be-
tween players intensifies. For players with negatively interdependent pref-
erences this intensified competition ends up with negative material payoff.
Notice that opting out is no option for these players (provided the technology
parameter r is not too large). Opting out by an individual would raise the
others’ absolute payoffs above zero payoff level, while it fixes his own utility
to a negative value. If r is very large, opting out becomes profitable. This
threshold value of r is faster reached for the case of more spiteful players.
Our results point in the same direction as the result of Eaton and Eswaran
(2003). They find that agents with preferences for relative payoffs are shown
to behave more aggressively and that this leads to a reduction in the pop-
ulation size when this size is endogenous. As seen in Figure 3.1 equilibria
with the active subset k exist if r ≤ rmax(k). This is a necessary condition
for the existence of such equilibria. The number of active players depends
on the discriminatory power.
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3.4 Heterogeneous Spiteful Players and Constant
Returns to Scale
Now, assume that players in the rent-seeking contest are heterogeneous due
to different interdependent preferences. We sort them via α1 ≤ α2 ≤ · · · ≤
αn. They face a constant returns to scale technology r = 1. This condition
is necessary to permit explicit solutions. To obtain a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium solution for this contest we follow and extend the framework of
Stein (2002). He investigates the properties of a single stage n players rent-
seeking contest with different valuations and/or different abilities among
the players and obtains a pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution. We
modify his framework by introducing heterogeneity with respect to different
preferences.
To simplify the analysis we introduce the following transformation parameter
λi =
n+ αi
n
. (3.11)
From αi ∈ [−1, 0] it follows that λi ∈
[
1− 1n , 1
] ⊆ [12 , 1]. Note that the most
spiteful player who has the smallest αi is assigned to the smallest λi value.
Hence, the transformation of αi to λi is just an adjustment of the interval
from the negative numbers into the positive ones. From now on we call
λi the preference parameter of individual i, regard the λ’s as endogenously
given and use them for all following calculations. We can sort the individuals
via λ1 ≤ · · · ≤ λn.
Under this condition, the partial derivative of the utility maximization prob-
lem of individual i changes to
∂Fi(x)
∂xi
=
∑n
j=1 xj − xi
(
∑n
j=1 xj)
2
V − λi. (3.12)
The first-order conditions for a maximum to exist fulfill ∂Fi(x)∂xi = 0 if xi > 0
and ∂Fi(x)∂xi ≤ 0 if xi = 0. It can be verified that the expected payoff and
therewith the utility is concave in each xi. Then,
∂Fi(x)
∂xi
= 0 implies that for
any xi > 0:
xi =
n∑
j=1
xj −
(
∑n
j=1 xj)
2λi
V
. (3.13)
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It is now possible to calculate the equilibrium solution x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗n).
Therefore, we first characterize which players have an incentive to take part
with positive effort. In this rent-seeking contest we may claim that there
are n potential players, but there is no reason to assume that all will make
positive expenditures. From Eq.(3.13) it follows that the sequence (xi : xi >
0) is ordered in the opposite way as the sequence (λi). The more spiteful
players expend more effort in the contest. Therefore, x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xk > 0
for some index k and xi = 0 for i > k. Since the expected payoff is concave
in xi, it is optimal for a player to use an interior point solution if one exists.
Players with small values of λi, who are more spiteful players, will make
positive expenditures whereas those with sufficiently high values will choose
to make no expenditure.
Now, calculate the sum of Eq.(3.13) over i = 1, . . . , k and solve:
∑
i≤k
xi =
k − 1∑
i≤k
λi
V
=
k − 1
k
V Γk (3.14)
where Γk =
[
1
k
∑
i≤k λi
]−1
is the inverse of the arithmetic mean of the first
k values of λi or - in other words - the harmonic mean of the first k values
of the sequence
(
1
λi
)
.
Eq.(3.14) can be used with Eq.(3.13) to yield an expression for the equilib-
rium strategy for player i for all i ≤ k:
x∗i =
k − 1
k
V Γk
[
1− (k − 1)Γkλi
k
]
. (3.15)
The individual effort x∗i consists of two parts. The first one is independent
of the individual preference and the same for all active players. The second
part shows the preference dependent effort. As we see later all potential
players take part in the contests. Therefore, Eq.(3.15) coincides for the case
of homogeneous players and a constant returns to scale with Eq.(3.5) and
Eq.(3.8) from the former section.
With Eq.(3.15) we can compute the probability that player i, i ≤ k, wins
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the contest:
pi =
x∗i∑
x∗j
=
k−1
k V Γk
[
1− (k−1)Γkλik
]
∑ k−1
k V Γk
[
1− (k−1)Γkλjk
]
=
1− (k−1)Γkλik
k − k−1k k∑λj ∑λj
= 1− (k − 1)Γkλi
k
. (3.16)
The winning probability of individual i depends on the number of active
players k, the inverse of the arithmetic mean of the preference parameters
Γk and his own preference parameter λi. k and Γk do not vary between
individuals. They are identical for all players. Since 0 < λ1 ≤ · · · ≤ λk it
follows that p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pk > 0. Player i is said to be more successful than
player j if pi > pj .
From Eq.(3.15) it is possible to determine the value of k. Given the equilib-
rium effort we can calculate the utility from participating in the contest and
the utility from non-participation. The individuals take part in the contest
whenever the former is higher than the latter.
∀i ∈ K : Fi(x∗(k)) ≥ Fi(0, x∗−i(k − 1))
piV − x∗i (k) + (λi − 1)(V −
∑
x∗j (k)) ≥ (λi − 1)(V −
∑
x∗j (k − 1))
Result 3.3 The number of active players k out of all potential players n is
found as the largest index k ≥ 2 such that
1
λi
≥ 1− (1−
k−1
k Γk)
2
1− k−2k−1Γk−1
.
This result can be used to show that all potential players be active in the
rent-seeking contest if we restrict the preference parameter λi to the interval
[n−1n , 1], as we did before.
Result 3.4 All potential players n take part in the contests with constant
returns to scale (r = 1) as long as λi ∈ [n−1n , 1], ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
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Proof. To show: 1λi ≥ 1−
(1−n−1
n
Γn)2
1−n−2
n−1Γn−1
valid for all λi ∈ [n−1n , 1].
From λi ∈ [n−1n , 1] it follows that 1 ≤ 1λi and therewith we can prove the
even stronger inequality
1−
(1− n−1∑
j≤n λj
)2
1− n−2∑
j≤n−1 λj
≤ 1
⇔
(1− n−1∑
j≤n λj
)2
1− n−2∑
j≤n−1 λj
≥ 0.
The quadratic term in the nominator is always bigger than zero. Hence, it
is still to show that the denominator is also positive.
1− n− 2∑
j≤n−1 λj
≥ 0
⇔ 1− n− 2∑
j≤n−1 λj
≥ 0
⇔
∑
j≤n−1
λj ≥ n− 2
Using the condition λj ≥ n−1n we yield∑
j≤n−1
λj ≥ (n− 1)(n− 1)
n
=
n2 − 2n+ 1
n
= n− 2 + 1
n
> n− 2.
The rent dissipation (RD), which is total expenditures by all players divided
by the rent V , is given from the Eq.(3.14) and the Result 3.4 by
RD =
n− 1
n
Γn. (3.17)
The rent dissipation depends on the harmonic mean of the sequence ( 1λi ).
If one of the preference parameter λi is increased and another one λj is
decreased by the same amount, then the rent dissipation does not change.
By direct computation, ∂RD∂λi = − n−1(∑λj)2 < 0 and ∂2RD∂λ2i = 2(n−1)(∑λj)3 > 0.
This leads to the following result:
Result 3.5 The rent dissipation decreases with an increase in an individual
preference parameter λi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n..
An increase in the preference parameter λi means that this player i gets less
spiteful. If a player is less spiteful it implies that he expends less effort and
therewith the rent dissipation decreases.
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3.5 Weakly Heterogeneous Players:
Equilibrium with all Players Participating
In the last section we have shown that the rent-seeking problem with hetero-
geneous players who exhibit negatively interdependent preferences is exactly
solvable for r = 1. For the case of two players, n = 2, and/or a constant
returns to scale technology, r = 1, the problem of rent-seeking contests with
heterogeneous players leads to first-order conditions which are exactly ana-
lytical solvable.4 In this section we use the technique of linearization which
refers to finding the linear approximation to a function at a given point
to find a numerical solution. Linearization is a method for assessing the
local stability of an equilibrium point of a system of nonlinear differential
equations. We approximate the solutions for a contest with an arbitrary
number of players n ≥ 2 and a discriminatory power r ∈ [0, nn−1 ] in a small
neighborhood around the homogeneous equilibrium for the case when the
heterogeneity of players is weak.5 Therefore, we assume in this first section
that all n players participate in the contest. Afterwards, we analyze the case
with less than all players participating.
To define weak heterogeneity, we first introduce the following average pa-
rameters. The average preference parameter is given by λ¯ = 1n
∑n
j=1 λj .
The preferences are concentrated around this average value which is indi-
cated by λi = λ¯(1 − βi), where |βi|  1 shows how weak the heterogeneity
is. βi shows how spiteful player i is compared to the average preference.
βi > (<)0 means player i is less (more) spiteful than the average player.
The average equilibrium effort of all players is given by x¯n =
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj .
With the average effort we can describe each single effort as xi = x¯n(1 + ei)
where |ei|  1. ei is the unknown difference in the effort levels due to the
heterogeneity. The obvious idea behind the following analysis is that small
heterogeneity in preferences can only lead to small differences in efforts.
That this is true, cannot be shown a priori. We first have to find the rela-
tive effort levels to derive conditions under which these levels remain small.
For the moment we can use the Taylor approximation for the analysis.
4For example, see Malueg and Yates (2004) for the case of n = 2 players; Stein (2002),
Epstein and Nitzan (2002), and Stein and Rapoport (2004) for the case of r = 1.
5See Ryvkin (2007) for the analysis of weakly heterogeneous players with differences
in the cost parameter.
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To find the equilibrium efforts we calculate the first-order condition:
xr−1i (
∑
xrj − xri )
(
∑
xrj)
2
=
λi
rV
, i = 1, . . . , n. (3.18)
Now, we linearize this generally nonlinear equation at the equilibrium effort
levels. Therefore, we substitute the representations for λi and xi in the
equation
x¯r−1n (1 + ei)r−1(
∑
x¯rn(1 + ej)
r − x¯rn(1 + ei)r)
(
∑
x¯rn(1 + ej)
r)2
=
λ¯(1− βi)
rV
⇔ (1 + ei)
r−1(
∑
(1 + ej)
r − (1 + ei)r)
(
∑
(1 + ej)r)2
=
x¯nλ¯(1− βi)
rV
. (3.19)
Then, we use a Taylor expansion around the homogeneous equilibrium. Tay-
lor expansion is applicable whenever payoffs are sufficiently smooth functions
of players’ actions in the neighborhood of the homogeneous equilibrium. The
homogeneous equilibrium results whenever players choose their preference
dependent part of effort, ei, equal to zero. For this reason, we use the Taylor
expansion of (1+ei)
r−1 = 1+(r−1)ei+O(µ2) and (1+ei)r = 1+rei+O(µ2)
up to the first-order around zero. As a measure of the accuracy of the lin-
ear approximation, we introduce a single small parameter µ = maxi∈N |βi|.
From now on all equations involving the relative equilibrium effort levels ei
just hold with accuracy O(µ2) due to the Taylor approximation. Substitut-
ing these two expressions into Eq.(3.19) yields
[1 + (r − 1)ei][
∑
(1 + rej)− (1 + rei)]
[
∑
(1 + rej)]2
=
x¯nλ¯(1− βi)
rV
. (3.20)
After some further transformations we get
[1 + (r − 1)ei][n+ rE − 1− rei)]
[n+ rE]2
=
x¯nλ¯(1− βi)
rV
⇔ n− 1 + rE − rei + (n− 1)(r − 1)ei + (r − 1)reiE − (r − 1)re
2
i
n2 + 2nrE + r2E2
=
x¯nλ¯(1− βi)
rV
and neglecting all terms of order higher than one in ei and βi results in
n− 1 + rE − rei + (n− 1)(r − 1)ei = x¯nλ¯
rV
(n2 + 2nrE − βin2), (3.21)
where E =
∑n
i=1 ei.
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Using the definitions of average effort x¯n and single effort ei we get xi =
x¯n + x¯nei =
1
n
∑
xj +
1
n
∑
xjei. This equation consists of two parts, one
part which is independent of preferences and one dependent part. The in-
dependent part composes the stationary steady state. As long as all players
participate, the equilibrium effort is a smooth function in the heterogeneity
of players. Therefore, we can take Eq.(3.5) as the stationary steady state
around which we approximate. We split the above equation in parts of the
steady state, the symmetric equilibrium level, and the dependent individ-
ual preference part to find the resultant deviation from the homogeneous
equilibrium. Hence, x¯n must be chosen such that
n− 1 = x¯nλ¯n
2
rV
⇔ x¯n = n− 1
n2
1
λ¯
rV. (3.22)
Using the remaining terms in Eq.(3.21), which demonstrate the differences
arising from the heterogeneity, yields
rE + ((n− 1)(r − 1)− r)ei = (n− 1)
(
2rE
n
− βi
)
, ∀i ∈ N . (3.23)
In the following, this is the equation of interest. It determines the preference
dependent part of efforts. We sum up all single equations for every i and
introduce β¯n =
1
n
∑
βi. This gives us
nrE + ((n− 1)(r − 1)− r)E = (n− 1)(2rE − nβ¯n) (3.24)
which leads after some further transformations to E = nβ¯n. Inserting this
into the above Eq.(3.23) yields
ei =
βi − rn−2n−1 β¯n
1− rn−2n−1
. (3.25)
The relative effort ei is a weighted average of the relative preference of
player i, βi, and the average relative preference, β¯n. Note that β¯n =
1
n
∑
βi
is constructed to be zero for the case with all players participating. It
becomes different from zero if the players start to drop out of the contest.
Relative equilibrium effort levels ei, Eq.(3.25), must be checked for self-
consistency as mentioned before. First, they are supposed to remain small.
This is fulfilled if
|βi|  1− rn− 2
n− 1 ∀i ∈ N . (3.26)
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When the discriminatory power r is small, this constraint is not binding.
When the discriminatory power r becomes larger, the range of allowed het-
erogeneity shrinks. For the case r = n−1n−2 no heterogeneity is allowed to
satisfy the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. Hence, we as-
sume for more than two players r < n−1n−2 as an additional condition in our
model for weakly heterogeneous players. The equilibrium with n players
participating satisfies this condition. We already showed for the case with
n players that the stronger inequality r ≤ (n+α)(n−1−α)(n−1+α)
(n−1)3+α(n+α) must hold
independent of α ∈ [−1, 0]. Second, none of the active players should have
an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy and leave the contest.
Suppose individual i considers to drop out of the contest and the other play-
ers believe that individual i will actively participate. The active players then
maintain their strategies as indicated. We need to compare the utility of
player i for the cases of participation and non-participation to test whether
the equilibrium is stable. This comparison gives the following participation
condition
∀i ∈ N : Fi(x∗(n)) ≥ Fi(0, x∗−i(n))
⇔ V
n
(1 + rei − r
n
E)− λ¯x¯n(1− βi + ei) ≥ 0. (3.27)
After some transformations and the substitution of the expressions for x¯n
and ei, Eq.(3.27) turns to the following inequality which we call participation
condition PC(N )
V
n
[
1− r(n− 1)
n
+
r(βi − β¯n)(1− rn−2n )
1− rn−2n−1
]
≥ 0. (3.28)
The term, which accounts for the heterogeneity, is proportional to the dif-
ference (βi− β¯n) between the relative preference of player i and the average
preference.
The material payoff of player i after the linear approximation is given by
Πi(N ) = V
n
[
1− r(n− 1)
λ¯n
+
1− n−1
λ¯n
1− rn−2n−1
rβi −
1− rn−2
λ¯n
1− rn−2n−1
rβ¯n
]
. (3.29)
Result 3.6 If a player’s preference is stronger, βi > 0 (weaker, βi < 0)
than the average, his payoff is above (below) the homogeneous value.
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The requirement Eq.(3.28) (PC(N )) implies that necessarily the result-
ing constraint from the homogeneous participation condition, Eq.(3.9), also
holds, which is stronger than the inequality r < n−1n−2 . In the presence of weak
heterogeneity the participation condition for homogeneous players, Eq.(3.9),
is not sufficient. The player with the weakest preference resp. smallest βi,
player n, has the lowest payoff. Hence, he is the first potential candidate
to drop out of the contest. His participation condition PC(N ) does not
hold at first. Therefore, the correct constraint is of the form r ≤ rmax(N ),
where rmax(N ) is a solution of the participation condition PC(N ) for the
player with the weakest preferences respective highest preference parameter
λ. rmax(N ) is close to rmax(n), therefore we assume that the solution has
the form r = rmax(n)(1 + δ(N )) where |δ(N )| << 1. The result is given by
δ(N ) =
1
n + β˜n(n− 3)−
[
( 1n + β˜n(n− 3))2 − 4β˜n(1− β˜n)(n− 2)
]1/2
2(n− 2)(1− β˜n)
.
(3.30)
Result 3.7 Weakly heterogeous players start dropping out at a smaller tech-
nology parameter r compared to the homogeneous contest.
Proof. In Eq.(3.30) β˜n = βn − β¯n is the difference of the weakest player
from the average strength. If all players participate, as assumed, β˜n < 0
and therewith δ(N ) ≤ 0.
3.6 Weakly Heterogeneous Players: Equilibrium
with less than all Players Participating
It has been shown formally that payoffs are higher for players with more
spiteful preferences. Consequently, the equilibrium of n actively participat-
ing players ceases to exist when the participation condition of the player
with the weakest preference does not hold anymore. At that point the n-th
player drops out of the contest. The remaining n−1 players then find them-
selves in a situation similar to the one discussed in the previous section, but
this time with n − 1 instead of n players. As the technology parameter r
increases further, some other player drops out, and so on. Consider now
an intermediate equilibrium after n− k players dropped out, 2 < k ≤ n, in
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which players K = {1, . . . , k} are active, while players {k + 1, . . . , n} have
dropped out. For players in the subset K, the average homogeneous effort
x¯k should be used as the reference effort. Then, the unknown equilibrium
effort should be written in the form xi(K) = x¯k(1 + ei(K)). Further, let
β¯(K) = 1k
∑
j∈K βj denote the average relative preference in a subset K,
with β¯(N ) ≡ β¯n. Then, following the same logic as in the previous section,
the equilibrium relative effort of the active players will be
ei(K) =
βi − r k−2k−1 β¯(K)
1− r k−2k−1
, i ∈ K. (3.31)
The material payoffs of the active players become
Πi(K) = V
k
[
1− r(k − 1)
λ¯k
+
(1− r k−1
λ¯k
)rβi − (1− r k−2λ¯k )rβ¯k
1− r k−2k−1
]
. (3.32)
Let us now identify the conditions under which subset K will be active in
equilibrium. As before, the technical condition to be able to use a linear
approximation is |βi| << 1 − r k−1k−2 , i ∈ K, which implies in particular r <
k−1
k−2 . It also must be fulfilled that no player in K has an incentive to drop
out. Let k denote the player with the least spiteful preference in the subset
K. Using Eq.(3.32), the expression for the upper bound on r can be written
as rmax(K) = rmax(k)(1 + δ(K)), with
δ(K) =
[
1
k + β˜k(k − 3)
]
−
[(
1
k + β˜k(k − 3)
)2 − 4β˜k(1− β˜k)(k − 2)]1/2
2(k − 2)(1− β˜k)
.
(3.33)
Here again β˜k = βk − β¯(K) is the difference of the weakest player from the
average relative preference. Since β˜k < 0 it can be easily seen that the
correction δ(K) is always negative, as before. The second bracketed term in
the numerator is always bigger than the first bracketed term. It means that
players start dropping out on a smaller technology parameter compared to
the homogeneous contest.
3.7 Numerical Illustration
In this section we illustrate via a numerical example the results obtained
above. Assume a small rent-seeking contest of four (n = 4) heterogeneous
CHAPTER 3. INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES 60
equilibrium relative efforts
-0,15
-0,10
-0,05
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0 0,05 0,1
d
e
equilibrium material payoff
0,070
0,075
0,080
0,085
0,090
0 0,05 0,1d
Pi
1
2
3
4
maximal level of r
1,20
1,25
1,30
1,35
1,40
0 0,05 0,1d
r (
m
a x
)
Figure 3.2: The equilibrium relative efforts (left), the equilibrium payoffs
(middle) and the maximal level of r for n = 4 weakly heterogeneous players,
as a function of heterogeneity parameter d. Discriminatory power r = 0.8
is used in the left and middle panels.
players, who have averaged negatively interdependent preferences of the
value α = −0.5 and compete for prize V = 1. The heterogeneity is consid-
ered to be weak. To simplify the analysis we assume the relative preferences
βi to be distributed along the interval (−d, d), where d  1. Specifically,
we set βi = d
n+1−2i
n+1 . If d = 0 all players have the same negatively interde-
pendent preferences leading us back to the homogeneous case. We calculate
all relevant values dependent on the heterogeneity measure d up to a value
of d = 0.1. The results for the case when all four players are active are
shown in Figure (3.2). The left panel shows the equilibrium relative ef-
forts ei as a function of d for r = 0.8. They start from ei = 0 for d = 0.
They increase (decrease) with an increasing d for the two players, whose
preferences lie above (below) the average preference. This means that more
spiteful players spend a higher relative effort. The middle panel shows the
equilibrium payoffs Πi as a function of d. They behave in the same kind as
the equilibrium relative efforts, starting from the homogeneous value of the
payoff. With an increasing heterogeneity, increasing d, players with more
(less) spiteful preferences exert higher (lower) payoffs. The equilibrium of
all players participating exists for 0 ≤ r ≤ rmax(N ). This threshold value
as a function of d is shown in the right panel. It decreases monotonically
with increasing heterogeneity.
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3.8 Conclusion
Players with identical preferences are rarely observed in real-world contests.
In the present chapter we analyze contests between heterogeneous players.
Heterogeneity exists due to different preferences of players. The preference
functions are all interdependent, which means that the utility of player i
depends on his own payoff as well as on the averaged payoff of all players.
The preference functions are of different interdependence because they vary
in the individual weight set to the averaged payoff. For a constant returns
to scale technology we calculate the asymmetric equilibrium arising in the
contest. To generalize the result for decreasing and increasing returns to
scale we have to use the trick of a Taylor expansion because first-order
conditions are not longer exactly analytical solvable. We Taylor expand
around the equilibrium arising with homogeneous players. Therefore, we
have to assume weak heterogeneity among the players.
In the present chapter we analyze contests with arbitrary marginal efficiency,
in which preferences of players are close but still distinguishable. We study
weak heterogeneity using a simple but powerful technique of linear approx-
imation. Its basic idea is that efforts of weakly heterogeneous players in
equilibrium are close to those of identical players who have the same av-
eraged preference parameter. The equilibrium of identical players is often
well characterized, and the behaviors of weakly heterogeneous players can
then be analyzed by Taylor-expanding the corresponding function around
the homogeneous equilibrium. This generic idea is not limited to contests,
it is applicable whenever payoffs are sufficiently smooth functions of players’
actions in the neighborhood of the homogeneous equilibrium. It is method-
ologically important that the limits of validity of the linear approximation
can be obtained within the approximation itself. The explicit analytical ex-
pressions derived in the linear approximation produce results for equilibrium
effort levels and payoffs of players. This expression for equilibrium effort lev-
els and payoffs in the linear approximation only contains the player’s own
preference, βi, and the average preference in the population, β¯n. These
expressions are also relevant to contests with private values (Malueg and
Yates (2004)), where only the distribution of preferences in the population
is known. It is interesting to see how robust the symmetric equilibrium is
with respect to weak heterogeneity. In contests, the elasticity of effort with
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respect to a player’s own preference is large, which implies that weakly het-
erogeneous players respond strongly to a change in their relative advantage
or disadvantage. In contrast, the elasticities of effort with respect to the
other player’s preferences are small, which means that the player’s reaction
to information about changes in the weak heterogeneity of others is small.
These findings are independent of parameter values.
For Tullock contests of identical players with independent preferences Perez-
Castrillo and Verdier (1992) identified the sequence of equilibria that arise
as the discriminatory power increases. We find that this sequence is shifted
downwards through the introduction of negatively interdependent prefer-
ences and is changed through the introduction of heterogeneity. In the case
of heterogeneity between the players the upper bound on r is downward-
sloping and destroys some of the equilibria. Weak heterogeneity qualita-
tively alters the structure of the equilibria compared to the homogeneous
case with respect to the question who drops out first. In the homogeneous
equilibria it does not matter which player drops out of the contest first.
However, even weak heterogeneity determines the weakest player who drops
out first.
A remark can be made on situations in which the heterogeneity becomes
strong. Clearly, the equilibrium effort levels and payoffs will deviate signif-
icantly from those predicted by the linear theory, but the overall tendency
should remain the same: players with more spiteful preferences exert higher
efforts and enjoy higher payoffs (Guse (2006)). The upper bound on r for
the existence of a particular equilibrium configuration should still drop with
increasing heterogeneity, as disparity between the player who is the least
spiteful and the rest of the active subset increases.
Chapter 4
Two-Stage Between-Group
Rent-Seeking with
Negatively Interdependent
Preferences1
4.1 Introduction
Various economic, political and social interactions can be viewed as rent-
seeking contests. One component in the theoretical literature on rent-seeking
tournaments are group rent-seeking contests. An example for these group
contests are struggles for government support such as request for subsidies,
lobbying for relaxed regulations, imposing tax reductions between different
industries. Given that many interest groups of players are involved, the
competition is an example of group decision making. This chapter examines
group rent-seeking contests in which rent-seeking activities take place in two
stages.2 In the first stage two groups of homogeneous players compete for
a single rent V . Aggregate group effort determines the probability that the
group wins the rent. No predetermined distribution rule exists in the groups
like in Nitzan (1991). Instead, the members of the winning group compete
1Content and results of Sections 4.1 - 4.3 are published in Risse (2010). The original
publication is available at www.springerlink.com. c©Springer-Verlag
2For an overview of the literature on rent-seeking and contests see Tollison (1982),
Nitzan (1994), Corchon (2007) or Konrad (2009).
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in a second stage for the prize, which may, but need not, be divisible in
this stage. Individual spending determines the probability that a particular
individual receives the rent or the proportion of the rent allocated to each
member. The results derived in this chapter apply to both situations. We
call this analyzed model two-stage Between-Group contest. Afterwards, we
compare those results of the two-stage Between-Group contest with the re-
sults of a standard one-stage individual contest and the results of another
two-stage group contests, the Semi-Finals Contest. In the Semi-Finals model
one player is chosen from each of the two groups through competing for the
position and then these two players compete for the rent by expending effort
in a second stage. Semi-Finals contests are analyzed beside others by Parco,
Rapoport, and Amaldoss (2005), Moldovanu and Sela (2006), Baik and Lee
(2000), Lee (2003), Easterlin (2009) and Sheremeta (2009).
Earlier work in the literature for two-stage Between-Group rent-seeking is
provided by Katz and Tokatlidu (1996). In a model with symmetric rent
valuation, they focus on the relation between group size and aggregate rent-
seeking. They show that social waste does not only depend on total number
of players but also on the distribution across groups. In this case group size
asymmetry facilitates the reduction of rent dissipation. This chapter ex-
tends the Katz and Tokatlidu model by introducing a technology parameter
and by relaxing the common assumption of purely self-interested preferences
of the players. In order to allow for status seeking interests we introduce
the concept of negatively interdependent (relative) preferences (Section 4.2).
Relative preferences can be seen in individual decisions as well as in group
decision making. They have been shown to play an important role in both
individual and group decision making. Porac, Wade, and Pollock (1999)
and Alexopolos and Sapp (2006) analyze the impact on the observed eco-
nomic behavior of firms. Executive compensation in firms is based on a
comparison of firm performance to the performance of other, similar firms.
Hence, managers will focus their actions on improving the performance of
their firm relative to a set of competitor firms. Therefore, many firms ap-
pear to maximize their market share at the expense of profits, a strategy
which corresponds to relative behavior. Individuals may also care about
their own payoffs relative to those of others and not just about the ab-
solute level of their payoffs. These individuals have relative rather than
absolute preferences. Empirical evidence on relative preferences is given in
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Bewley (1995), Clark and Oswald (1996), Sobel (2005), Kapteyn, van der
Geer, van de Stadt, and Wansbeck (1997), Solnik and Hemenway (1998)
and Levine (1998). Their results indicate that there are many situations in
which individuals exhibit relative preferences.
Introducing agents with negatively interdependent preferences in a two-stage
rent-seeking contest translates into adding another strategic component to
the theoretical decision-making process. The relative maximizer’s aim is to
beat the average payoff and this is not only achieved by increasing one’s
own payoff, but also by reducing the payoff of the other players. Behavior
that lowers the own payoff and the rival’s payoff even more has been termed
“spiteful” (Hamilton (1970)). In the context of two-stage contests, it can
occur via lowering the opponents (group) probability of winning the contest.
Wa¨rneryd (1998) uses the two-stage Between-Group contest to discuss the
implications of the possibility of costly influence activities for the endogenous
formation of different jurisdictional systems. Through a comparison with a
one-stage contest, Wa¨rneryd (1998) shows that less resources are spent in
aggregate on appropriative activities under a federalist system of two-stage
rent-seeking than in a unified jurisdiction with a single central government.
Using the concept of interdependent preferences we can show that the two-
stage contest model does not always lead to less rent dissipation as Wa¨rneryd
(1998) predicts (Section 4.3).
Built upon the model of Katz and Tokatlidu, Stein and Rapoport (2004)
compare two variations of a two-stage contest. They consider more than
two groups and focus on asymmetries between groups and players. They
find that the percentage of rent dissipation - the ratio of total expenditures
to the expected value of the rent - is higher under the Semi-Finals than
under the Between-Group model. The result on rent dissipation in two-stage
contests provided by Stein and Rapoport (2004) is point of departure for
Section 4.4. We also compare rent dissipation in the two variations of a two-
stage contest. However, we go a step further by allowing for an alternative
preference structure of the players, i.e. relaxing the common assumption
of purely self-interested preferences. Using the concept of interdependent
preferences we can show that the Semi-Finals model does not always lead
to higher rent dissipation.
To date, there is hardly any theoretical work on the characteristics and
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the potential impact of negatively interdependent preferences on contest
outcomes, even though Leininger (2009) has shown that evolutionary sta-
ble preferences in contests are negatively interdependent. One exception
is Guse and Hehenkamp (2006) who analyze rent-seeking contests with a
heterogeneous population in which part of the players are absolute payoff
maximizers while others are also concerned about their relative position.
As a result, it is those players with negatively interdependent preferences
who experience a strategic advantage in general two-players contests and
in n-players-contests with non-increasing marginal efficiency. In contrast,
we focus in this chapter on homogeneous populations in which the players
have either absolute preferences or strongly negatively interdependent pref-
erences, in order to find the influence of preference types on the aggregate
rent-seeking and therewith on the contest-structure choice.
As noted by Gradstein and Konrad (1999), in certain contexts the contest
rule is exogenously determined. In other applications it is the outcome of
a judicious design intended to attain a variety of objectives. According to
experiences in political rent-seeking, politicians who allocate rents through a
contest value high outlays. Would they have the choice to design a contest,
they would choose the one that results in outlay maximization. Therefore,
one objective is the maximization of the outlays by the contestants in a
rent-seeking contest. To achieve the best possible objective, Gradstein and
Konrad (1999) compare a one-stage contest with a pairwise multistage con-
test. Whereas, we analyze the outlays of players in a one-stage contest, and
in two different two-stage contests and compare the resulting rent dissipa-
tion.
The remainder of the chapter is graphed in Figure 4.1 and is structured
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as follows: In Section 4.2, we analyze the properties of our basic contest-
structure, the two-stage Between-Group contest. Therefore, we introduce
the model (4.2.1) and analyze it with a technology parameter under the as-
sumption of absolute payoff maximizers following Katz and Tokatlidu (1996)
(4.2.2). In addition we extend the analysis to players with negatively inter-
dependent preferences. Afterwards, we examine the relationship between
group size and rent-seeking (4.2.3) and the relationship between preference
type and rent-seeking in the two-stage contest (4.2.4). In Section 4.3 we com-
pare the results of the two-stage Between-Group contest with those of an
individual one-stage contest to find the influence of the assumed preferences
on the contest-structure. The theoretical results are applied to the case of
the formation of jurisdiction, unification and federalism (4.3.3). In the first
two sections (4.2 and 4.3) the basic contest is called two-stage contest to
pronounce the difference to the compared structure, the one-stage contest.
In Section 4.4 we compare the results of the basic two-stage Between-Group
contest with those of the Semi-Finals contest. Both analyzed structures
are two-stage contests. Therefore, we call the basic contest Between-Group
contest. First, we present the Nash equilibria in the Between-Group contest
adjusted for the case with constant returns to scale technology, equal sized
groups and an additional preference parameter. Afterwards, we analyze the
Semi-Finals model separately for players with absolute payoff preferences
and players with negatively interdependent preferences (4.4.2). Then, we
compare the rent dissipations of the two contests to investigate the influ-
ence of the assumed preferences on the choice of the contest-structure (4.4.3).
The theoretical results of this section are applied to the case of USA and
German elections (4.4.4) and to the case of awarding prestige sport events
(4.4.5). Finally, we conclude in (4.4.6).
4.2 Two-Stage Between-Group Contest: Analysis
and Properties
4.2.1 The Model
Assume that the government intends to adopt a policy that will provide a
rent V to group X or to group Y . The rent V can be monetary or non
monetary. Group sizes are exogenously given. Groups X and Y consist
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respectively of n and m homogeneous risk neutral members. Each player
has the same valuation for the rent. A member of a group is given a chance
to compete directly for the rent V only if its group is awarded the rent. In the
first round members of each group attempt to obtain the rent for their own
group. The two groups play an inter-group Tullock contest, which means
that a group of players can make an investment in order to participate in a
lottery. The higher a group’s investment, the higher its chance of winning
the prize. Hence, their initial rent-seeking is group-oriented. Denote the
first round rent-seeking pursued by member i of group X and member j of
group Y by x1i and y1j respectively, and denote the probability that group
X (Y ) is awarded the rent by pX (pY ). We assume the probability that a
given group will win the rent depends on the value of this group’s outlays
relative to the outlays of both groups: Extending Tullock (1980) for groups,
the probability that group X wins the rent is given by the ratio
pX =
∑n
i=1 x
r
1i∑n
i=1 x
r
1i +
∑m
j=1 y
r
1j
(4.1)
where r is the technology parameter.3 It determines whether the contest is
characterized by a decreasing (r < 1), constant (r = 1) or increasing (r > 1)
returns to scale technology. The technology will not be changed during the
whole contest and is the same for all players.
The probability that group Y wins the rent, pY , is equal to 1−pX . After the
completion of the first round, each member of the winning group engages
in rent-seeking activities in order to win the rent V or a part of the rent V
for himself. The members of the winning group play an intra-group Tullock
contest. Denote the second round rent-seeking investment pursued by mem-
ber i of group X and member j of group Y by x2i and y2j respectively. The
first stage investment is sunk. If group X has won the first round, then its
i-th member will win in the second round with probability
pxi(x21, . . . , x2n) =
xr2i∑n
l=1 x
r
2l
. (4.2)
If group Y has won the first round, its j-th member will win the rent in the
second round with probability
pyj(y21, . . . , y2m) =
yr2j∑m
l=1 y
r
2l
.
3For an axiomatic foundation of group contest success functions see Mu¨nster (2009).
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The parameter r can be interpreted as a measure of how decisive relative
effort is. For instance, if r approaches zero, the probability to win the rent
tends to 1/n respective to 1/m, indicating that the designation of the winner
is independent of effort. If r approaches infinity, the contest becomes fully
discriminatory. Then the prize is always awarded to the contestant who
exerts the most effort, and the random elements of the contest outcome
disappear.
We could see pxi and pyj not as winning probabilities of the whole rent but
as shares of the rent, which we could divide in the second round into shares
for the different participants of this stage. This feature does not change the
analysis.
The model follows Katz and Tokatlidu (1996), but we introduce the tech-
nology parameter r in the winning probability function and, in addition,
agents with relative preferences. We restrict the technology parameter to
decreasing or constant returns to scale technologies, which means r ≤ 1. The
analysis of the contest with increasing returns to scale technology (r > 1)
goes beyond the scope of this chapter, because then the existence of a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed.
The first round of the contest does not offer individuals an ultimate payoff.
It only determines the probability that a contestant will participate in the
second round. The marginal benefit of an individual’s first round investment
is the increased probability to win the ultimate rent. Hence, the rent-seeking
activities of individuals in the first round are determined by optimizing their
expected payoff, given that all individuals act rationally and optimally in
the second round.
First we analyze the model under the assumption that players are absolute
payoff maximizers following Katz and Tokatlidu (1996). In a second step,
we assume rent-seekers to be relative payoff maximizers. Like in Kockesen,
Ok, and Sethi (2000) and Guse (2006) the focus lies on intra-group symmet-
ric equilibria, where all players choose the same effort level in each group.
We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this game via back-
ward induction. Therefore we start the analysis with the second stage. All
previous rent-seeking expenditures are sunk at this stage.
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4.2.2 Analysis
Analysis with Absolute Payoff Maximizers
Without loss of generality assume that group X with n players wins the
contest in the first stage. Therefore, we analyze the second stage of the
contest from the perspective of the players of group X. For group Y the
analysis applies equivalently.
The Second Stage In the second round the i-th member of group X
maximizes his payoff of the second stage
F abs2i = Π2i(x1, . . . , xn) (4.3)
= pxiV − x2i
where pxi is the success probability of player i chosen as in (4.2).
Assuming a symmetric Nash equilibrium within each group and a regular
interior solution, the first-order condition for member i of group X is
∂F abs2i
∂x2i
=
rxr−12i
∑
l 6=i x
r
2l
(
∑
xr2l)
2
V − 1 != 0. (4.4)
Since we assume agents to be homogeneous and search for symmetric equi-
libria, we set x2i = x2l = x2. This gives
rx2r−12 (n−1)
(nxr2)
2 V −1 = 0 which is solved
by
xabs2 =
n− 1
n2
rV. (4.5)
This is our unique candidate for an interior solution. The second-order
conditions proving the maximum are given as
∂2F abs2i
∂x22i
=
(r(r − 1)xr−22i
∑
xr2l + r
2x2r−22i − x2r−22i (2r − 1)r)V
(
∑
xr2l)
2
−2(rx
r−1
2i
∑
xr2l − x2r−12i r)V xr−12i r
(
∑
xr2l)
3
!
< 0.
Simplification under the assumption that all players have identical prefer-
ences leads to
V r(rn2 − n2 − 3rn+ n+ 2r)
n3x2
< 0.
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This holds in the symmetric case xabs2 =
n−1
n2
rV if
n(rn− n− 2r)
V r(n− 1) < 0
⇐⇒ rn− 2r − n < 0
⇐⇒ r(n− 2)− n < 0.
Hence, the second-order conditions for local maximization holds for r < nn−2 .
Note that the second-order conditions implies global concavity of the payoff
function if r ≤ 1: The bracketed term in the numerator is always negative,
the one in the denominator always positive. Hence, the local optimum is
a global one for all r ≤ 1. We concentrate on the case of a decreasing
returns to scale technology, which means r < 1. Therefore, the second-order
conditions for local maximization is always fulfilled: r ≤ 1 < nn−2 .
Since the second-order condition is satisfied for all r ≤ 1, we have found the
global unique Nash equilibrium effort for the second stage of our model with
absolute payoff maximizers as given in Eq.(4.5).
Substituting the optimal effort (4.5) of each member of group X in the utility
function (4.3), we find that the individual’s valuation of entering round two
is 1nV − n−1n2 rV = n(1−r)+rn2 V for a member of group X. If a player enters
the second round of the contests he can earn this amount of the rent. The
amount is the difference between the share of the rent he gets minus his
effort chosen in this stage. Every player will bear this optimal payoff in
mind when finding an optimal effort level for the first stage. Hence, in the
first round each group-member solves the rent-seeking maximization for a
reduced rent:
V absn =
n−nr+r
n2
V for group X and V absm =
m−mr+r
m2
V for group Y .
The value of entering the second round is lower for a member of the larger
group, because the prize is divided by the number of members.4
The First Stage In the first stage of the contest with the given group
success function (4.1), an absolute payoff maximizing individual i of group
X tries to maximize his own payoff Π1i, which is given as
F abs1i = Π1i =
∑
xr1l∑
xr1l +
∑
yr1j
V absn − x1i. (4.6)
4See Mu¨nster (2007) for further insights on the group-cohesion effect.
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Calculating the first-order condition gives
∂F absi
∂x1i
=
rxr−11i
∑
yr1j
(
∑
xr1l +
∑
yr1j)
2
V absn − 1 != 0. (4.7)
Following our assumption that members in each group have identical pref-
erences, we can write that
∑
xr1l = nx
r
1 and
∑
yr1j = my
r
1. Substituting this
in the Eq.(4.7), we get
rxr−11 my
r
1
(nxr1 +my
r
1)
2
V absn − 1 = 0. (4.8)
This holds equivalently for a player of group Y :
ryr−11 nx
r
1
(nxr1 +my
r
1)
2
V absm − 1 = 0.
After some calculations and equating both equations we get
nx1V
abs
m = my1V
abs
n . (4.9)
Substituting this relation of x1 and y1 in the above Eq.(4.8) we get the
solution
xabs1 =
rmV absn (
nV absm
mV absn
)r
(m( nV
abs
m
mV absn
)r + n)2
. (4.10)
This is the optimal effort of a player of group X in the first stage if all
players have absolute preferences. The optimal effort of a player of group Y
in the first stage, yabs1 , can be calculated analogously.
yabs1 =
rnV absm (
mV absn
nV absm
)r
(n(mV
abs
n
nV absm
)r +m)2
. (4.11)
Analysis with Relative Payoff Maximizers
We now repeat the analysis of the two-stage contest under the assumption
of relative payoff maximizers. We choose the simplest and at the same time
strongest kind of social comparison. In our preference function the averaged
payoff of the rivals has the same valency as the own payoff. We choose it
that way to make the differences in the equilibrium behavior considerable
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visible. If we choose a lower weight of the rivals payoff in the preference
function, the results would be the same but weaker in the valency.
We assume that group X with n players wins the contest in the first stage.
Therefore, we concentrate the analysis of the second stage of the contest on
the players of group X.
The Second Stage In the second round the i-th member of group X
maximizes
F rel2i = Π2i(x1, . . . , xn)− Π¯2(x1, . . . , xn)
=
xr2i∑n
l=1 x
r
2l
V − x2i − 1
n
(
V −
n∑
l=1
x2l
)
(4.12)
where Π¯2 is the population mean payoff of the second stage. The success
probability of player i is chosen as in Eq.(4.2). In this stage the individual
is concerned of his payoff compared to the payoff of his own group members.
The other group is not involved in this stage and hence not included in his
utility function.
Assuming a symmetric Nash equilibrium within each group and a regular
interior solution, the first-order condition for member i of group X is
∂F rel2i
∂x2i
=
rxr−12i
∑
l 6=i x
r
2l
(
∑
xr2l)
2
V − 1 + 1
n
!
= 0. (4.13)
Since we assume identical agents and search for symmetric equilibria, we set
x2i = x2l = x2. This gives
xr−12 (n−1)xr2
n2x2r2
rV − 1 + 1n = 0 which is solved by
xrel2 =
r
n
V. (4.14)
(4.14) is our unique candidate of an interior solution of the second stage.
We again concentrate on the case of a decreasing or constant returns to
scale technology (r ≤ 1). The second-order condition for a local maximum
becomes
∂2F rel2i
∂x22i
= rV
(r − 1)x
r−2
2i
∑
l 6=i
xr2l(
∑
xr2l)
2 − 2rx2r−22i
∑
l 6=i
xr2l
∑
xr2l
(
∑
xr2l)
4
 < 0,
(4.15)
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which under the assumption that all players are identical, simplifies to:
rV
n− 1
n3
[
(r − 1)n− 2r
x22
]
< 0. (4.16)
(4.16) holds in the symmetric solution xrel2 =
r
nV if
n−1
n
1
rV [(r − 1)n− 2r] <
0, which holds if rn − 2r − n < 0. Hence, the second-order condition for
local maximization holds for r < nn−2 .
Note that the second-order condition implies global concavity of the relative
payoff function, if r ≤ 1 holds: The term in parentheses in the numerator
is always negative, the one in the denominator always positive. Hence, the
local optimum is a global one for all r ≤ 1.5
Result 4.1 Aggregate rent dissipation in xrel2 of the second stage is inde-
pendent of the number of contestants in the rent-seeking contest:
n · rnV = rV
An equilibrium in a contest displays overdissipation (full dissipation, under-
dissipation) if and only if
∑n
i=1 x
rel
i > (=, <)V , respectively. In this case the
technology parameter r determines the dissipation rate of this stage.6 The
dissipation rate r represents the efficiency of the given contest technology.
For r < 1 there is underdissipation of the rent, for r = 1 full dissipation and
for r > 1 overdissipation as long as the existence of the Nash equilibrium is
secured.
Calculating the benefit of entering the second round requires to take a
broader view on the whole game. In the second stage the individuals with
relative preferences want to maximize their payoff in comparison to those of
their own group-members, because those are still the only active players in
the contest. Under this assumption the optimal effort is given as rnV in the
second stage. Now, analyzing the first stage, individuals additionally com-
pete with the members of the rival group. Players want to maximize their
payoff compared to those of all other players. The benefit of entering the
second round is now the difference in the material payoff between individual
5For r > 1 the proof is technically beyond the scope of this chapter. See Hehenkamp,
Leininger, and Possajennikov (2004) for it.
6Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov (2004) show that this is also the unique
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in an evolutionary game with absolute payoffs.
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i and the average over all other players. We first substitute the optimal
effort ( rnV ) into Eq.(4.3) and find that the individual’s material payoff is
1−r
n V for a member of group X. Second, regarding all players we calculate
the utility of entering the second stage assuming group X won the rent in
the first stage.
V reln =
1− r
n
V − n
1−r
n V +m · 0
m+ n
=
m
m+ n
1− r
n
V (4.17)
Due to the sunk costs each player solves the rent-seeking maximization for
a reduced rent in the first round: V reln =
m
m+n
1−r
n V for members of group
X and V relm =
n
m+n
1−r
m V for members of group Y .
For constant returns to scale technologies (r = 1) this reduced rent is zero.
None of the players has an incentive to expand any effort in the first stage.
The competition on the second stage is so strong that there is full rent
dissipation as it can be easily seen from Result 4.1.
The First Stage The utility of a relative payoff maximizing individual i
of group X is F rel1i = Πi − Π¯, where Π¯ is the population mean payoff:
Π¯ =
∑n
l=1 Πl +
∑m
j=1 Πj
n+m
=
pXnV
rel
n −
∑n
l=1 x1l + pYmV
rel
m −
∑m
j=1 y1j
n+m
and the success function of the groups pX respective pY chosen as in Eq.(4.1).
With these we get
F rel1i =
∑
xr1l∑
xr1l +
∑
yr1j
V reln − x1i −
1
n+m
·( ∑
xr1l∑
xr1l +
∑
yr1j
nV reln −
∑
x1l +
∑
yr1j∑
xr1l +
∑
yr1j
mV relm −
∑
y1j
)
.
The first-order condition is given by
∂F reli
∂x1i
=
rxr−11i
∑
yr1j
(
∑
xr1l +
∑
yr1j)
2
V reln − 1−
1
n+m
·(
rxr−11i
∑
yr1j
(
∑
xr1l +
∑
yr1j)
2
nV reln − 1−
(
∑
yr1j)rx
r−1
1i
(
∑
xr1l +
∑
yr1j)
2
mV relm
)
!
= 0.
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Following our assumption that group members are identical within each
group, we have
∑
xr1l = nx
r
1 and
∑
yr1j = my
r
1. Substituting this in the
first-order condition, we yield
rxr−11 my
r
1
(nxr1 +my
r
1)
2
V reln − 1−
1
n+m
·(
rxr−11 my
r
1
(nxr1 +my
r
1)
2
nV reln − 1 +
−myr1rxr−11
(nxr1 +my
r
1)
2
mV relm
)
= 0.
Equivalently, we get for a player of group Y :
ryr−11 nx
r
1
(nxr1 +my
r
1)
2
V relm − 1−
1
n+m
·(
ryr−11 nx
r
1
(nxr1 +my
r
1)
2
mV relm − 1 +
−nxr1ryr−11
(nxr1 +my
r
1)
2
nV reln
)
= 0.
After some manipulations and equating both equations we get
m2yrel1 = n
2xrel1 . (4.18)
Substituting (4.18) into the FOC, we yield
xrel1 =
1
n+m− 1 ·
rm2(m
2
n2
)r(V reln + V
rel
m )
(n(m
2
n2
)r +m)2
. (4.19)
4.2.3 Relationship between Group Size and Rent-Seeking
The First Stage Rent-Seeking
The effect of an increase in the size of the player’s own group on the indi-
vidual effort spend in the first round is negative (∂x1∂n < 0), no matter what
preference type we assume. Players of bigger groups spend as an individ-
ual less effort than players of smaller groups. They have a lower expected
payoff at the second stage. The effect of an increase in the size of group Y
on the first stage effort done by players of group X is ambiguous (∂x1∂m
≥
<0).
It depends on the assumption of preferences and on the distribution of the
players across groups. If group X is the smaller group (n < m), the effect is
negative under the assumption of absolute payoff maximizers. This means
that effort spend by group X decreases as group Y becomes even larger. If
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group X is the bigger group (n > m) it is a positive effect. An increase in
the size of the smaller group raises first-round effort by the larger group.
Whereas for players with negatively interdependent preferences the effect is
the reverse. If the already bigger group increases even more, the effect is
positive. This means that effort spend by the smaller group X increases
as group Y becomes even larger. If group X is the bigger group (n > m)
it is a negative effect. An increase in the size of the smaller group abates
first-round effort by the larger group.
Summarized these findings give:
Result 4.2 In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the contest it holds
true that
i.) individual expenditures of the first stage decrease with an increasing
size of a contestants own group independent of preference type.
ii.) under the assumption of absolute preferences individual expenditures of
the first stage decrease (increase) with an increasing size of the rivals
group, if the group asymmetry increases (decreases).
iii.) under the assumption of relative preferences individual expenditures of
the first stage decrease (increase) with an increasing size of the rivals
group, if the group asymmetry decreases (increases).
The Overall Rent-Seeking
If we take a look at the contest from a welfare perspective, we focus on the
aggregate expenditures Rabs and Rrel in the whole contest to determine the
social waste. Since the first stage outcome assigns a probability of winning
to each group rather than determining a winner, the amount of aggregate
effort will depend on which group enters the second round. Therefore, we
aggregate the expenditures of the single stages and add them up multiplied
by their probability to occur; once for the contest with absolute payoff max-
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imizers and once for the contest with relative payoff maximizers.
xabs1 =
rmV (n
3(m−mr+r)
m3(n−nr+r) )
r(n− nr + r)
n2(m(n
3(m−mr+r)
m3(n−nr+r) )
r + n)2
yabs1 =
rnV ( m
3(n−nr+r)
n3(m−mr+r))
r(m−mr + r)
m2(n( m
3(n−nr+r)
n3(m−mr+r))
r +m)2
xabs2 =
n− 1
n2
rV
yabs2 =
m− 1
m2
rV
Rabs = nxabs1 +my
abs
1 + pi
abs
x nx
abs
2 + pi
abs
y my
abs
2 (4.20)
where piabsx =
nx1
nx1+my1
and piabsy =
my1
nx1+my1
are the probabilities that group
X or group Y reaches the second stage of the contest, respectively.
The aggregate effort of the contest with relative payoff maximizers is given
as
xrel1 =
1
(n+m− 1)(n+m) ·
rm2(m
2
n2
)r( nm +
m
n )(1− r)V
(n(m
2
n2
)r +m)2
yrel1 =
1
(n+m− 1)(n+m) ·
rn2( n
2
m2
)r( nm +
m
n )(1− r)V
(m( n
2
m2
)r + n)2
xrel2 =
r
n
V
yrel2 =
r
m
V
Rrel = nxrel1 +my
rel
1 + pi
rel
x nx
rel
2 + pi
rel
y my
rel
2
= nxrel1 +my
rel
1 + rV. (4.21)
Under the assumed decreasing returns to scale technology (r < 1) there is
always underdissipation of the rent in the contest independent of the pref-
erence assumption. With an increasing number of players in both groups(
lim
n→∞ limm→∞ or limm→∞ limn→∞
)
the aggregate expenditure converges to rV , but
never reaches rV as long as the number of players is finite.7 The difference
between the two scenarios is that in the case of players with absolute pref-
erences, it converges from below and in the case with relative preferences
from above.
7Iterated limits are computed with Maple.
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If the number of players in just one group increases, there are three effects on
the aggregate effort. Assume the number of players in group Y , m, increases
whereas n the number of members of group X remains constant. The effect
of m on Rabs is given by
∂Rabs
∂m
=
∂(nxabs1 )
∂m
+
∂(myabs1 )
∂m
+ piabsy
∂(myabs2 )
∂m
+
∂piabsx
∂m
(nxabs2 −myabs2 ).
(4.22)
The sum of the first two terms in (4.22) is negative. It captures the effect
in the first stage effort done by both groups. Whenever one group becomes
larger the cumulative effort of both groups in the first stage shrinks, because
the competition in the second stage increases. The third term in (4.22) is
positive and outweighs the first sum. It measures the actual anticipated
increase in second round aggregate effort. Then the overall effect is positive.
These first three terms determine the direct effect of an increasing number
of players. The last fraction measures the indirect effect through the chang-
ing asymmetry between the groups. It depends on the distribution of the
players across groups. Under the assumption of absolute payoff maximizers
the effect is negative if the group asymmetry increases and it is positive
otherwise.
In the contest with status seekers the effect of m on Rrel is given by
∂Rrel
∂m
=
∂(nxrel1 )
∂m
+
∂(myrel1 )
∂m
. (4.23)
This sum consists of two effects and can be negative or positive. Under
the assumption of status seekers the second stage effect is not relevant,
because the effort of the second stage does not change with the number of
participants. The terms in (4.23) capture the effect in the total first stage
effort done by both groups to an increase of the number of members of
group Y . The first effect arises through the changing asymmetry between
the groups. It is positive if the group asymmetry increases and it is negative
otherwise. The other one arises in group Y through the increase in the
own group size and it is always negative. If group asymmetry is strong, the
former exceed the latter. The effort of the second stage does not change
with an increase in the size of one group. It is constant and independent
from the distribution of players. Therefore, the overall effect is ambiguous.
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4.2.4 Relationship between Preference Type and
Rent-Seeking
We have seen that the second stage equilibrium with relative payoff maxi-
mizers is given by xrel2 =
r
nV . In comparison, the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium with absolute payoff maximizers is given by xabs2 =
n−1
n2
rV .
When comparing the effort levels of the two Nash equilibria of the second
stage we find that the agent interested in relative payoffs shows a higher
effort gaining lower payoffs than the agent maximizing absolute payoffs
( rnV >
r
nV − rn2V ). Hence, the incentive of the relative maximizers to
reach the second round is smaller.
In a private good contest for the rent V , as in the second stage of our model,
the contest with relative payoff maximizers always leads to a higher expendi-
ture than the one with absolute payoff maximizers.8 The Nash equilibrium
under the assumption of absolute preferences yields a positive value of the
first derivative of the relative maximization function. A marginal increase
of expenditures beyond the optimal absolute Nash level increases relative
payoff. First, a marginal increase of expenditure has second order negative
effects on a player’s own payoff because the first derivative of his payoff func-
tion is zero at the absolute Nash level. Second, a marginal increase has a first
order negative effect on the other players’ payoff, because cross-derivatives
in the absolute Nash equilibrium are always negative. Resulting in the case
that the difference between one’s own and others’ payoffs increases.
At the first stage the effect is the reverse. The aggregate expenditure of
the first stage in the equilibrium with relative preferences is always lower
than those of the Nash equilibrium of players with independent preferences.
Nevertheless, the explanation given above is still valid. How can it be? This
result is driven by the different premises. Players valuations to enter the sec-
ond round of the contest are unequal. If we compare the benefit of entering
the second stage of absolute payoff maximizers (1−rn V +
r
n2
V ) with those of
relative payoff maximizers ( mm+n · 1−rn V ), we find that absolute maximizers
have a higher valuation of the rent in the first stage. This creates a much
stronger effect than the effect arisen from the different preferences and ex-
plains the observed asymmetry in the player’s behavior. The relative payoff
maximizers still act more aggressively, but given the different premises, the
8See Leininger (2003) and Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov (2004).
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much lower rent valuation, they spent less effort compared to the absolute
payoff maximizers. The difference in the chosen effort tends toward zero as
the number of players increases.
The effects of both stages counteract each other, but since the effect of the
second stage is stronger, it dominates the first-stage effect.
Result 4.3 The total expenditure in equilibrium of the overall two-stage
contest with relative preferences is higher than the overall expenditure in the
contest with absolute maximizers.
Proof. To show:
RDrel > RDabs
⇔ (nx
rel
1 +my
rel
1 + rV )
V
>
(nxabs1 +my
abs
1 + pi
abs
x nx
abs
2 + pi
abs
y my
abs
2 )
V
.
First, we know that the rent dissipation in the two-stage contest with relative
payoff maximizers is always bigger than the technology parameter (RDrel >
r). Second, the rent dissipation under the assumption of a fixed number
of absolute payoff maximizing individuals is bounded above by the rent
dissipation of the contest with the same number of players which are ordered
in groups with the same size. Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) analyze in a two-
stage group contest how the magnitude of aggregate rent seeking depends on
the total number and on the distribution of population across groups. They
find that a given population distributed equally among groups will tend to
yield more rent seeking than an unequally distributed one. Therefore, it is
enough to show that r > ((n + m)xabs1 +
n+m
2 x
abs
2 )/V where now x
abs
1 and
xabs2 are the chosen effort levels with
n+m
2 players in each group.
r >
[
(n+m)xabs1 +
n+m
2
xabs2
]
/V
⇔ r > (n+m)r(
n+m
2 − n+m2 r + r)
n+m
2 (n+m)
2
+
(
1− 1n+m
2
)
r
⇔ 1 >
[
n+m
2
(1− r) + r
]
2
(n+m)2
+ 1− 2
n+m
⇔ 0 > 1− r + 2r
n+m
− 2
⇔ 1 >
(
2
n+m
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
r
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Figure 4.2: Rent dissipation in the two-stage contest with absolute payoff
maximizers (blue) and with relative payoff maximizers (red). Parametriza-
tion: r = 0.5.
We have shown that RDrel > r > RDabs(n+m)/2 ≥ RDabs. For an impression
of the rent dissipation of the two-stage contest scenario see Figure 4.2.
In a two stage group contest the incentive to increase one’s own expenditure
is counteracted by the free-rider problem. An increase above the Nash level
still advances one’s own position in relation to members of the other group,
but it puts oneself also at a disadvantage in relation to one’s own group
members. They can free-ride on the additional spiteful effort. Free-riding
is in the context of relative payoff maximizers sensible spiteful behavior
against members of the own group. Free-riding increases ex post the payoff
of members of the other group, which brings along a decrease in one’s own
relative payoff, but it increases one’s own payoff by even more.9
4.3 Comparison with One-Stage Contests
4.3.1 Analysis One-Stage Contest
A natural alternative to a two-stage contest like the one outlined above is an
individual one-stage contest, in which all members of both groups are pooled
9See for this problem Leininger (2002).
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together and fight in a one-stage Tullock contest for the rent or for a part of
the rent V . This is the simplest way to model a contest and therefore used
here as a first comparison-contest. To compare these two different structures
of a contest, we calculate the efforts of the players in a one-stage contest:
once for the case with absolute payoff maximizers and once for the case of
relative payoff maximizers.
The effort of an individual in a one-stage contest for (n+m) players with the
contest success function proposed by Tullock can be calculated analogously
to the second stage of the two-stage contest. Differences are just in the
number of players, n + m instead of n or respective m, and in the amount
of the rent. The equilibrium effort for the case of players with absolute
preferences is described as:
x∗abs =
n+m− 1
(n+m)2
rV. (4.24)
The dissipation rate is given by RDoneabs =
n+m−1
(n+m) r.
The expenditure for payoff maximizers with relative preferences is charac-
terized by:
x∗rel =
r
(n+m)
V, (4.25)
whereas the dissipation rate is given by RDonerel = r.
4.3.2 Comparison of Two-Stage Contest and
One-Stage Contest
Comparing the results of a one-stage contest with those of a two-stage con-
test, we find the following:
Result 4.4
i.) In the case of absolute payoff maximizers total expenditure in a one-
stage contest is always higher or equal than in a two-stage contest.
ii.) For relative payoff maximizers total expenditure in a one-stage contest
is always lower or equal than the one in a two-stage contest.
Proof. ad i.) To prove: RDoneabs ≥ RDtwoabs
Since group size asymmetry acts to reduce the rent dissipation in a two-stage
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contest10 the rent dissipation in a contest with n+m2 players in each group is
higher than the rent dissipation of the two-stage contests with n players in
group X and m players in group Y . Assuming the same group size without
changing the total number of participating players the rent dissipation is
given as RDtwoabs = (n+m)x
abs
2 +
n+m
2 x
abs
1 where x
abs
1 and x
abs
2 are calculated
with n+m2 players in group X. Using this result it is enough to show
n+m− 1
n+m
r ≥ (n+m)r(
n+m
2 (1− r) + r)
n+m
2 (2
n+m
2 )
2
+
n+m
2 − 1
n+m
2
r
⇔ 1− 1
n+m
≥ (n+m)
(
n+m
2
(1− r) + r
)
2
(n+m)3
+ 1− 2
n+m
⇔ 1 ≥
(
n+m
2
(1− r) + r
)
2
(n+m)
⇔ 1 ≥ (1− r) + 2r
(n+m)
⇔ 0 ≥ 2r
(n+m)
− r.
The last inequality is always fulfilled since n+m > 2.
The left panel in Figure 4.3 shows the comparison of the rent dissipation in
the framework of absolute payoff maximizers.
ad ii.) In the framework of relative payoff maximizers the rent dissipation
of the one-stage contest is equal to the technology parameter r and equal
to the rent-dissipation of the second stage in the two-stage contest. In the
two-stage contest there is additionally the effort of the first stage. Therefore,
the rent dissipation of the two-stage contest overtops the rent dissipation of
the one-stage contest.
The right panel in Figure 4.3 shows the comparison of the rent dissipation
in the framework of relative payoff maximizers.
Adding an additional stage before the one-stage contest results in a higher
rent dissipation in the framework of players with negatively interdependent
preferences. In this framework the second stage of the two-stage contest
and the one-stage contest exhibit the same aggregated amount of effort.
The aggregated rent dissipation is independent of the number of contestants
which is the only difference between the second stage of the two-stage con-
test and the one-stage contest. Whereas, adding an additional stage in the
10See for this result the former section or Katz and Tokatlidu (1996).
85 CHAPTER 4. GROUP RENT-SEEKING
Figure 4.3: Left panel: Rent dissipation of absolute payoff maximizers in
the two-stage contest (blue graph) compared to a one-stage contest (red
graph). Right panel: Rent dissipation of relative payoff maximizers in the
two-stage contest (blue graph) compared to a one-stage contest (red graph).
Parametrization: r = 0.5.
framework of players with independent preferences influences the aggregate
expenditures in the former existing stage. An additional stage reduces the
number of contestants in the second stage since only the winning group of
the first stage takes actively part in the second stage. The reduction of the
expenditure in the second stage due to the lower number of contestants in
this stage outweighs the increase due to the effort expanded in the additional
stage.
Let’s now endogenize the contest structure. One might imagine a contest
organizer who is interested in maximizing the efforts expended by the play-
ers.11 If the contest organizer believes that the players have absolute pref-
erences, he should prefer a one-stage contest to elicit lower total aggregate
effort. However, if he thinks they are relative payoff maximizer, he should
favor the two-stage contest. The differences decrease with an increasing
number of players and the dissipation rate of all contest structures converges
to r.
11See Gradstein and Konrad (1999) for endogenizing contest structures.
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4.3.3 Application: Federalism or Unitary State
An important responsibility of a government is to distribute parts of the
national income through regulations. There are two different endogenous
formations of jurisdiction for a country with two regions. On the one hand,
there is the system of federalism. A federation is a union comprising a
number of partially self-governing regions united by a central government.
Hence, sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing
authority and constituent political units like states or regions. One ex-
ample is the German political federal system. Seen from a more abstract
perspective, Germany’s political system resembles our theoretical two-stage
Between-Group model. Political decisions are made on two hierarchical
stages. First, the countrywide government decides about the magnitude of
GNP to be distributed across regions. Once the level of GNP has been de-
cided the local regions can influence the share they will receive (first stage).
In a second step the pie is divided within the regions. This corresponds to
our two-stage model discussed above. In the first stage, there are two (or
more) groups, the different federal states, competing against each other in
a contest organized by the government. In the second stage, the individuals
of the winning province start an intra group contest to split up the rent.
The individuals of the second stage could also be interest groups composed
of many individual agents like cities, single political parties or lobbyists, but
we abstract in this chapter from the problem of enforcing cooperation within
such a group.12
In contrast to the model of a decentralized state, we could think of a uni-
tary state. Both regions are unified into a single jurisdiction. The incentives
of this jurisdiction are analogous to the one-stage contest we presented in
this chapter. We assume that the unification does not have any (technolog-
ical) efficiency gains or losses effecting GNP. Hence, the total rent and the
appropriative activities are the same in both jurisdictions.
Wa¨rneryd (1998) analyzes these two models of rent-seeking contests on the
endogenous formation of jurisdictions. Under the assumption that the po-
litical process is a costly battle to acquire shares of GNP, he finds that less
resources are spent in aggregate on appropriative activities under a hierar-
12See Olson (1965), Nitzan (1991) and Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, and Orzen (forth-
coming).
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chical system of federalism than in a unified jurisdiction with a single central
government. Hence, federalism weakens the competition in the distribution
of scarce resources. The rate of rent dissipation is strictly lower than under
unification.
Under the assumption of relative preferences of the players, our result con-
trasts Wa¨rneryd (1998) who shows that it is more efficient for an aggregate
effort maximizing principal respective the government to induce unification,
because then the rent dissipation rate is higher. In our model with rel-
ative payoff maximizers and a decreasing returns to scale technology the
federal system would induce a strictly higher rate of rent dissipation than
the unified jurisdiction. For this reason, unification does not always in-
crease competition among individuals in the sense that the global rate of
dissipation increases such as Wa¨rneryd (1998) stated. Therefore, the deci-
sion about the preferable jurisdiction has to go in line with the assumption
on the preference structure of the contestants.
4.3.4 Conclusion
This section examines the rent dissipation in a group rent-seeking contest
in which rent-seeking activities take place in two stages compared to the
rent dissipation of a one-stage individual contest. Changing the common
assumption of purely self-interested preferences in rent-seeking contests, it
is shown that the choice of the contest structure is ambiguous and depends
on the preference-type. We find that rent dissipation given absolute payoff
maximizers in a two-stage contest is lower than in a one-stage contest and
given relative seekers it is the reverse.
This result carries over to the case of endogenous formation of jurisdictions:
It depends on the assumption of preferences whether resources are spent
more efficiently in a decentralized or a centralized government structure. In
contrast to the perceived literature we find that a system of federalism is not
always significant in ameliorating distributional competition and conflict.
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4.4 Comparison with Semi-Finals Contests
4.4.1 The Adapted Between-Group Model
In this section we present the main results, adopted to our particular setting,
of the two-stage Between-Group model analyzed in the former section. We
use the special case of two equal sized groups (n = m) and a constant returns
to scale technology (r = 1). But we extend the interdependent preference
function for an additional parameter, α, which displays the weight of how
much players care for the averaged population payoff.
Between-Group Contest with Absolute Payoff Maximizers
Introducing a constant returns to scale technology and equal sized groups
converts the probability that group X wins the rent in the first stage,
Eq.(4.1), into
pX =
∑n
i=1 x1i∑n
i=1 x1i +
∑n
j=1 y1j
(4.26)
and the probability that its i-th member will win in the second round,
Eq.(4.2), into
pxi(x21, . . . , x2n) =
x2i∑n
l=1 x2l
. (4.27)
Given these new contest success functions we maximize the utility functions
(4.3) of the second stage and (4.6) of the first stage which results in the
optimal equilibrium effort
xabs2 =
n− 1
n2
V (4.28)
and
xabs1 = y
abs
1 =
1
4n3
V. (4.29)
This is the optimal effort of a player of group X as well as of group Y if all
players have absolute preferences.
From a welfare perspective, we can now determine the degree of social waste.
The degree of the social waste, the rent dissipation RDabsBG, is defined as the
aggregate expenditures made in both stages of the contest divided by the
amount of rent.
RDabsBG = (2nx
abs
1 + nx
abs
2 )/V = (
1
2n2
+
n− 1
n
) (4.30)
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Between-Group Contest with Relative Payoff Maximizers
We now repeat the analysis of the Between-Group contest under the as-
sumption of relative payoff maximizers. The material payoff function of the
second stage is again given as in Eq.(4.3) and in Eq.(4.6). The players max-
imize their expected utility given relative preferences: The utility function
is of the form
F rel2i = Πi(x) + α
1
n
n∑
j=1
Πj(x)
where α ∈ [−1, 0]. The individual i maximizes a sum of his own material
payoff and a weighted average payoff of all active players. The restriction
that the preference parameter α can only take values between −1 and 0
ensures that the utility function of each player depends more on his own
payoff than on the averaged payoff. The value α = 0 conforms to the above
analyzed case of absolute payoff maximizers.
We assume again that group X with n players wins the contest in the first
stage. Therefore, we concentrate the analysis of the second contest stage on
the players of group X. In the second round the i-th member of group X
maximizes
F rel2i = Π2i(x) + α
1
n
n∑
l=1
Π2l(x)
=
x2i∑n
l=1 x2l
V − x2i + α 1
n
(
V −
n∑
l=1
x2l
)
. (4.31)
In this stage the individual i is concerned with his payoff relative to the
payoff of his own group members. Members of the other group have lost
the first stage competition and therefore dropped out of the contest. The
individual i does not include the other group members in his utility function.
Assuming a symmetric Nash equilibrium within the group and a regular
interior solution, the first-order condition for member i of group X is
∂F rel2i
∂x2i
=
∑
x2l − x2i
(
∑
x2l)2
V − 1− α 1
n
!
= 0. (4.32)
Since we assume identical agents and search for symmetric equilibria, we set
x2i = x2l = x2. This gives the optimal effort of the second stage
xrel2 =
n− 1
n(n+ α)
V. (4.33)
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Eq.(4.33) is our interior equilibrium solution of the second stage. To find the
equilibrium solution of the first round we calculate the benefit of entering
the second stage and use this value as a reduced rent which the individuals
can imaginary win in the first stage. Regarding all players and the optimal
effort of the second stage as defined in Eq.(4.33), we calculate the utility of
entering the second stage.
V˜ relBG =
1 + α
n(n+ α)
V + α
n 1+αn(n+α)
2n
V = (1 +
α
2
)
1 + α
n(n+ α)
V (4.34)
Hence, in the first round each player solves the rent-seeking maximization
for a reduced rent. For the parametrization α = −1, extreme spitefulness,
this reduced rent is zero. The players dissipate the complete rent in the
competition on the second stage. They do not have an incentive to spent
any effort in the first stage.
The utility of a relative payoff maximizing individual i of group X in the
first stage is F rel1i = Πi + αΠ¯, where Π¯ is the population mean payoff:
Π¯ =
∑n
l=1 Πl +
∑n
j=1 Πj
2n
=
pXnV˜
rel
BG −
∑n
l=1 x1l + pY nV˜
rel
BG −
∑n
j=1 y1j
2n
(4.35)
and the success function of the groups pX respective pY chosen as in (4.26).
With these we get
F rel1i =
∑
x1l∑
x1l +
∑
y1j
V˜ relBG − x1i + α
(
nV˜ relBG
2n
−
∑
x1l +
∑
y1j
2n
)
. (4.36)
The first-order condition is given by
∂F rel1i
∂x1i
=
∑
y1j
(
∑
x1l +
∑
y1j)2
V˜ relBG − 1−
α
2n
!
= 0. (4.37)
Following our assumption that players are identical, we have
∑n
l=1 x1l =
nx1 =
∑n
j=1 y1j . Substituting this in the first-order condition, we yield
xrel1 =
1
(1 + α2n)4n
V˜ relBG =
(1 + α2 )(1 + α)
2n(2n+ α)(n+ α)
V. (4.38)
If we take a look at the contest with status seekers from a welfare perspective,
we focus on the rent dissipation RDrelBG in the whole contest to determine
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Figure 4.4: Rent dissipation of the Between-Group contest.
the social waste. Therefore, we aggregate the expenditures of the single
stages multiplied by their absolute frequency. The aggregate effort of the
contest with relative payoff maximizers in proportion to the rent (Figure
4.4) is given as
RDrelBG = (2nx
rel
1 + nx
rel
2 )/V =
(
(1 + α2 )(1 + α)
(2n+ α)(n+ α)
+
n− 1
n+ α
)
. (4.39)
Relationship between Preference Type and Rent-Seeking in the
Between-Group Contest
We again want to analyze the relationship between the preference type and
the rent dissipation in the two-stage Between Group contest. The arising
question is if Result 4.3 still holds for all α ∈ [−1, 0].
We have seen, the second stage Nash equilibrium with relative payoff maxi-
mizers is given by xrel2 =
n−1
n(n+α)V . In comparison, the unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of this stage when players have absolute payoff maximiz-
ing preferences is given by xabs2 =
n−1
n2
V . When comparing the effort levels
of the second stage in the Nash equilibria , we find that independent of the
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preference parameter α the players interested in relative payoffs exert more
effort gaining lower payoffs than the players maximizing absolute payoffs.
Focusing on the first stage of the contest, the aggregate expenditure in the
equilibrium with relative payoff maximizers is always lower than those of
the Nash equilibrium of players with absolute independent preferences. The
effects of both stages counteract each other, but since the effect of the second
stage is stronger, it dominates the first-stage effect. We can conclude
Result 4.5 The total expenditure and along with it the rent dissipation in
equilibrium of the overall Between-Group contest with negatively interdepen-
dent preferences is higher than the overall expenditure and rent dissipation
in the contest with absolute payoff maximizers.
Proof. The idea of this proof is to show that the minimum of the rent
dissipation with respect to α under the assumption of relative preferences
lies at α = 0 and that this coincides with the rent dissipation under the
assumption of absolute preferences. Partial derivative of the rent dissipation
of the Between-Group contest with respect to the preference parameter is
given as
∂RDrelBG
∂α
=
(1 + α) + 2(1 + α2 )
2(2n+ α)(n+ α)
− (1 +
α
2 )(1 + α)
(2n+ α)2(n+ α)
− (1 +
α
2 )(1 + α)
(2n+ α)(n+ α)2
− n− 1
(n+ α)2
.
For n ≥ 2, we show
∂RDrelBG
∂α
< 0.
For α ∈ (−1, 0] the second and third term are negative and for α = −1 they
are zero. Analyzing all four terms of the derivative for α = −1 gives:
∂RDrelBG
∂α
=
3− 4n
2(2n− 1)(n− 1) < 0, ∀n ≥ 2.
Given the negative second and third term for α ∈ (−1, 0], it is sufficient to
show that the negative fourth term overtops or equalizes the positive first
term:
(1 + α) + 2(1 + α2 )
2(2n+ α)(n+ α)
≤ n− 1
(n+ α)2
⇔ (3 + 2α)(n+ α) ≤ 2(n− 1)(2n+ α).
Now, using the allowed range [−1, 0] for α we can displace (3+2α)(n+α) ≤
3n and 2(n − 1)(2n + α) ≥ (n − 1)(4n − 2). Therewith, it is sufficient to
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show that
3n ≤ (n− 1)(4n− 2)
⇔ 4n2 − 9n+ 2 ≤ 0.
Given the condition n ≥ 2 this is obviously fulfilled.
We have proved that the partial derivative of RDrelBG with respect to α is al-
ways smaller than zero (
∂RDrelBG
∂α < 0) and approximate zero for n→∞. The
rent dissipation function is strictly monotonic decreasing in α. A decrease
of the preference parameter α strictly increases the rent dissipation in the
Between-Group contest. The minimum of the rent-dissipation function is
situated at α = 0, because α is restricted to the interval [−1, 0]. If α = 0 the
rent-dissipations are equal RDrelBG = RD
abs
BG. Knowing that a decrease in α
results in an increase of the rent-dissipation we can state that for α ∈ [−1, 0]
the inequality RDrelBG > RD
abs
BG holds.
4.4.2 Analysis Semi-Finals Model
In contrast to the Between-Group model, in the Semi-Finals model the idea
is that group members of the same group have to compete for a mandate in
the first stage. Once, one individual wins the mandate, he must compete in
a second stage against the winner of the first stage of the rival group for the
rent V . This is appropriate when the competition consists of a semi-finals
round and final round with the semi-final winners selected from a partition
of the players. A classic example are sport events in which first stage events
are used for qualifying for the final round. Another example is an election
process consisting of primaries and final elections.
The Semi-Finals model assumes that 2n risk neutral and homogeneous play-
ers compete in a two-stage contest for a single indivisible rent V . Each
player has the same valuation for the rent. The 2n players are arranged
exogenously in two groups of same size, group X and group Y . Each player
competes within his group. Member i of group X invests effort x1i in the
first stage. One winner is selected from each group using Tullock’s contest
success function x1i∑n
l=1 x1l
as the probability that player i of this group ad-
vances to the second stage. On this stage the two winners of the semi-finals
stage compete against each other with the winner again chosen according to
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the Tullock contest rule x2x2+y2 . We assume again constant returns to scale
technology. The technology will not be changed during the whole contest
and is the same for all players.
The first round of the contest does not offer individuals an ultimate payoff;
it only determines the probability that a contestant will participate in the
second round. The marginal benefit of an individual’s first round investment
is the increased probability to win the ultimate rent. Hence, the rent-seeking
activities of individuals in the first round are determined by optimizing their
expected payoff, given that all individuals act rationally and optimally in
the second round.
First we analyze the model under the assumption that players are absolute
payoff maximizers following Stein and Rapoport (2004). In a second step,
we assume rent-seekers to be relative payoff maximizers. This extends the
analysis of a Semi-Finals two-stage rent-seeking contest to an additional
strategic component. Like in the last section the focus lies on intra-group
symmetric equilibria, where all players choose the same effort level. We solve
for a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this game via backward induc-
tion. Therefore, we start the analysis with the second stage. All previous
rent-seeking expenditures are sunk at this stage.
Semi-Finals Contest with Absolute Payoff Maximizers
In this subsection we summarize the main results presented in Stein and
Rapoport (2004) for the case of absolute payoff maximizing preferences,
two groups and identical rent valuations. In the second round the winning
member i of group X maximizes his utility, which is equal to the payoff.
F abs2i = Π2i =
x2
x2 + y2
V − x2 (4.40)
Assuming a symmetric Nash equilibrium x2 = y2 and a regular interior
solution we can solve the first-order condition. This gives the equilibrium
effort
xabs2 =
1
4
V. (4.41)
Substituting the optimal effort defined in Eq.(4.41) in the utility function
Eq.(4.40), we find that the individual’s valuation of entering round two
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V˜ absSF is
1
4V . If a player enters the second round of the contests he earns this
expected amount of the rent. Every player will bear this optimal payoff in
mind when finding an optimal effort level for the first stage. Hence, in the
first round each player solves the rent-seeking maximization for a reduced
rent: V˜ absSF =
1
4V .
In the first stage of the contest, an absolute payoff maximizing individual i
of group X tries to maximize his expected payoff Π1i, which is at the same
time the utility F abs1i and is given as
F abs1i = Π1i =
x1i∑
x1l
V˜ absSF − x1i. (4.42)
Solving the first-order condition under the assumption that all players have
identical payoff maximizing preferences, we get the solution
xabs1 =
1
4
n− 1
n2
V. (4.43)
This is the optimal effort of a player of group X as well as of group Y in
the first stage if all players have absolute preferences.
From a welfare perspective, we can now determine the degree of social waste.
Social waste or rent dissipation RDabsSF is defined as the aggregated expen-
diture by all players in proportion to the rent V .
RDabsSF =
(2nxabs1 + 2x
abs
2 )
V
=
2n(n− 1)
4n2
+
2
4
= 1− 1
2n
(4.44)
Semi-Finals Contest with Relative Payoff Maximizers
We now repeat the analysis of the Semi-Finals contest under the assumption
of relative payoff maximizers. The material payoff function is again given as
Πi =
xi∑n
l=1 xl
V − xi. (4.45)
The players maximize their expected utility. The utility function is of the
form F reli = Πi(x) + α
1
n
∑n
l=1 Πl(x) where α ∈ [−1, 0]. The individual i
maximizes a sum of his own material payoff and a weighted average of payoffs
of all active players. The restriction that the preference parameter α can
only take values between −1 and 0 ensures again that the utility function
of each player depends more on his own payoff than on the averaged payoff.
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The value α = 0 conforms to the above analyzed case of absolute payoff
maximizers.
We assume that member i of group X and member j of group Y win the
contest in the first stage. In the second round the i-th member maximizes
F rel2i = Π2i + α
Π2i + Π2j
2
=
x2i
x2i + y2j
V − x2i + αV − x2i − y2j
2
. (4.46)
In this stage the individual i is concerned with his payoff relative to the
payoff of his active rival. Other members of the groups have lost the first
stage competition and therefore dropped out of the contest. Individual i
does not include dropped out players in his utility function. Therefore, the
utility function just includes two individuals.
Assuming a symmetric Nash equilibrium and a regular interior solution, the
first-order condition for player i is
∂F rel2i
∂x2i
=
y2j
(x2i + y2j)2
V − 1− α1
2
!
= 0. (4.47)
Since we assume identical agents and search for symmetric equilibria, we set
x2i = y2j = x2. This gives
xrel2 =
1
2(2 + α)
V. (4.48)
To calculate the benefit of entering the second round we have to take a
broader view on the whole game. In the second stage the individuals with
relative preferences want to maximize their payoff in comparison to those
of the players, who are still active in the contest. Under this assumption
the optimal effort is given as 12(2+α)V in the second stage. Now, analyzing
the first stage, individuals additionally compete with all 2n active players.
Therefore, the players want to maximize their material payoff compared to
those of all other players. The benefit of entering the second round is now the
difference in the material payoff between individual i and the average over
all other players. Regarding all players we calculate the utility of entering
the second stage.
V˜ relSF =
1
2
V − 1
2(2 + α)
V + α
(
V − 2 12(2+α)V
2n
)
=
(
(n+ α)(1 + α)
2n(2 + α)
)
V (4.49)
97 CHAPTER 4. GROUP RENT-SEEKING
Hence, in the first round each player solves the rent-seeking maximization
for a reduced rent. For the parametrization α = −1, extreme spitefulness,
this reduced rent is zero. The players dissipate the complete rent in the
competition on the second stage. They do not have an incentive to spent
any effort in the first stage.
Given the reduced rent the utility of a relative payoff maximizing individual
i in group X in the first stage is
F rel1i =
x1i∑
x1l
V˜ relSF − x1i + α
(
2V˜ relSF −
∑
x1l −
∑
y1l
2n
)
. (4.50)
The first-order condition is given by
∂F rel1i
∂x1i
=
∑
x1l − x1i
(
∑
x1l)2
V˜ relSF − 1−
α
2n
. (4.51)
Following our assumption that group members are identical within each
group, we have
∑n
l=1 x1l = nx1. Substituting this in the first-order condi-
tion, we yield the equilibrium effort level
xrel1 =
1
1 + α2n
n− 1
n2
V˜ relSF
=
1
1 + α2n
n− 1
n2
(
(n+ α)(1 + α)
2n(2 + α)
)
V. (4.52)
If we take a look at the contest from a welfare perspective, we focus on
the rent dissipation RDrelSF in the whole contest to determine the social
waste. The aggregate effort of the contest with relative payoff maximizers
in proportion to the rent V can be seen in Figure 4.5 and is given as
RDrelSF =
2nxrel1 + 2x
rel
2
V
=
1
(1 + α2n)
(n− 1)
n2
(n+ α)(1 + α)
(2 + α)
+
1
2 + α
. (4.53)
Relationship between Preference Type and Rent-Seeking in the
Semi-Finals Contest
We have seen that the second stage effort in the equilibrium with relative
payoff maximizers is given by xrel2 =
1
2(2+α)V . In comparison, the unique
CHAPTER 4. GROUP RENT-SEEKING 98
Figure 4.5: Rent dissipation of the Semi-Finals contest.
pure strategy Nash equilibrium with absolute payoff maximizers is given by
xabs2 =
1
4V . When comparing the effort levels of the second stage of the two
Nash equilibria, we find that the player interested in relative payoffs invests
more effort but gaining lower payoffs than the agent maximizing absolute
payoffs. The competition on the second stage between the relative payoff
maximizers is stronger. Therefore, they waste more effort. The higher effort
reduces the expected payoff. Hence, the incentive of the relative maximizers
to reach the second round and therewith the valuation of the rent in the
first stage is smaller. These different valuations of the rent in the first stage
creates a asymmetry in the player’s behavior. In the equilibrium of the first
stage with relative preferences the aggregate expenditure is always lower
than those of the Nash equilibrium of players with absolute independent
preferences. The effects of both stages counteract each other, but since the
effect of the second stage is stronger, it dominates the first-stage effect.
Result 4.6 The total expenditure and therewith the rent dissipation in equi-
librium of the overall Semi-Finals contest with negatively interdependent
preferences is higher than the overall expenditure in the Semi-Finals con-
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test with absolute payoff maximizers.
Proof. The idea of this proof is to show that the minimum of the rent
dissipation with respect to α under the assumption of relative preferences lies
at α = 0 and this coincides with the rent dissipation under the assumption
of absolute preferences. The rent dissipation function is differentiable. The
partial derivative of the rent dissipation of the Semi Finals contest with
respect to the preference parameter is given as
∂RDrelSF
∂α
=
2(n− 1)(1 + α)
(1 + α2n)n
2(2 + α)
− (n− 1)(n+ α)(1 + α)
2n3(1 + α2n)
2(2 + α)
−(n− 1)(n+ α)(1 + α)
(1 + α2n)n
2(2 + α)2
− 1
(2 + α)2
.
First, we show
∂RDrelSF
∂α < 0. Leaving the negative fourth term out makes the
derivative even bigger. Therefore, we can analyze the first three terms:
2(n− 1)(1 + α)
(1 + α2n)n
2(2 + α)
− (n− 1)(n+ α)(1 + α)
2n3(1 + α2n)
2(2 + α)
− (n− 1)(n+ α)(1 + α)
(1 + α2n)n
2(2 + α)2
< 0
⇔ 2− n+ α
2n+ α
− n+ α
2 + α
< 0
⇔ −n2 + 3n+ α < 0.
This is obviously fulfilled for n ≥ 4 for all values of α and for n = 3 with
α ∈ [−1, 0). The case n = 3 with α = 0 can be shown by simply plugging
in the values into
∂RDrelSF
∂α . The derivative is still negative. Now, it is left to
prove that
∂RDrelSF
∂α < 0 for n = 2:
2(1 + α)
(1 + α4 )4(2 + α)
− (2 + α)(1 + α)
16(1 + α4 )
2(2 + α)
− ((2 + α)(1 + α)
(1 + α4 )4(2 + α)
2
− 1
(2 + α)2
< 0
⇔ 2(1 + α)
(4 + α)(2 + α)
− (1 + α)
(4 + α)2
− (1 + α)
(4 + α)(2 + α)
− 1
(2 + α)2
< 0
⇔ α2 − 2α− 12 < 0.
The last inequality is always fulfilled since α ∈ [−1, 0].
We have proved that the partial derivative of RDrelSF with respect to α is
always smaller than zero (
∂RDrelSF
∂α < 0). The rent dissipation function is
strictly monotonic decreasing in α. A decrease of the preference parameter
α increases the rent dissipation in the Semi-Finals contest. The minimum
of the rent-dissipation function is situated at α = 0, because α is restricted
to the interval [−1, 0]. If and only if α = 0 the rent-dissipations are equal
RDrelSF = RD
abs
SF .
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4.4.3 Comparison of Between-Group Contest and
Semi-Finals Contest
An equilibrium xi displays overdissipation (full dissipation, underdissipa-
tion) if and only if
∑n
i=1 xi > (=, <)V , respectively. In equilibrium of the
Between-Group contest as well as of the Semi-Finals contest we find for
absolute payoff maximizer always underdissipation and for relative payoff
maximizers underdissipation as long as α > −1. Comparing the rent dissi-
pations of the Between-Group contest with those of the Semi-Finals contest,
we find the following:
Result 4.7
i.) Total expenditure and rent dissipation under the assumption of abso-
lute payoff maximizers in a Semi-Finals contest is always higher or
equal than in a Between-Group contest.
ii.) Total expenditure and rent dissipation of relative payoff maximizers in
a Semi-Finals contest is for a sufficiently small α and n ≥ 3 lower or
equal than in a Between-Group contest.
Proof. ad i.) To show: RDabsBG ≤ RDabsSF
1
2n2
+
n− 1
n
≤ 2n− 1
2n
⇔ 1
n
≤ 1
The last inequality is always fulfilled because there are always at least two
players in the contest, n ≥ 2.
ad ii.) To show: RDrelBG ≥ RDrelSF(
(1 + α2 )(1 + α)
(2n+ α)(n+ α)
+
n− 1
n+ α
)
≥ 2(n− 1)(n+ α)(1 + α)
n(2n+ α)(2 + α)
+
1
2 + α
The preference parameter α ∈ (−1, 0) has to fulfill the following inequalities
to satisfy the above condition:
−1 ≤ α ≤ −3n
2 − 4n−√n(9n3 − 36n2 + 44n− 16)
3n− 4 .
This dependency is shown in the right panel of Figure 4.6. For a given
number of players n the sufficient preference parameter α for the relation
RDrelBG ≥ RDrelSF is calculated.
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Figure 4.6: Left panel: Rent dissipation for the BG contest (blue) and SF
contest (red). Right panel: Dependency of α to n. For preference parameter
smaller than this α the rent dissipation of the Semi-Finals contest under the
assumption of relative payoff maximizers is lower than the rent dissipation
in the Between-Group contest.
Let’s now endogenize the contest structure. One might imagine a contest
organizer who is interested in maximizing the efforts expended by the play-
ers.13 The designer can choose between the Between-Group contest and
the Semi-Finals contest. He picks the contest structure with the highest
rent-dissipation. The preferred contest structure depends on the assumed
type of players preferences. If the contest organizer believes that the players
have absolute preferences, he should prefer a Semi-Finals model to elicit
higher total aggregate effort. However, if he thinks they have strong neg-
atively interdependent preferences, he should favor in the most cases the
Between-Group model.
4.4.4 Application: Electoral Rules
An election is a decision making process where a population chooses an
individual to hold official offices. This is the usual mechanism by which
modern democracy fills offices in the legislature, sometimes for regional and
local government. There is a high universal acceptance of elections as a tool
for selecting representatives in modern democracies. In most democratic
13See Gradstein and Konrad (1999) for endogenizing contest structures.
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Figure 4.7: United States presidential election.
political systems, there is a range of different types of election. Here, we
compare the United States presidential election with the election of a federal
minister of the German cabinet concerning the arising rent dissipation. To
give a benchmark for the aggregated spendings during a presidential election
in the USA we refer to a table provided by Center for Responsive Politics on
the CNN web page14: total spending by presidential candidates 240 million
US-$ in 1996, 343 million US-$ in 2000, 718 million US-$ in 2004 and 586
million US-$ in 2008.
The election process of the President of the United States is split into two
stages as shown in Figure 4.7. Primary elections, the first stage of the con-
test, serve to narrow down a field of candidates. Once a candidate has been
elected for each party, the two candidates need to compete for office in the
general elections. The presidential primary election is the first stage in the
process of electing the President of the United States of America. A primary
election (nominating primary) is an election in which voters in a jurisdiction
select candidates for a subsequent election. In other words, primary elec-
tions are one means by which a political party nominates candidates for the
following general election. A political party is a political organization that
seeks to attain political power within a government. There are two major
political parties in the United States, the Democratic Party and the Repub-
14See CNN Politics web page (17/03/09):
http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/money/index.html.
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Figure 4.8: Elections of a federal minister of the German cabinet.
lican Party. The general election following the primaries is the second and
final step. This election system coincides with the above explained Semi-
Finals model. There are two groups, the two political parties, competing on
the first stage in primaries trough expanding effort in election campaigns.
The winning member is nominated for the second stage, the general election,
where he again spends effort in campaigning against the winner of the other
party.
By contrast the election of federal minister of the German cabinet coin-
cides with the Between-Group model. The election occurs in two stages
as shown in Figure 4.8. The first stage is the election of the Federal Diet.
The Federal Diet is the lower house of the German Parliament. Germany
has a multi-party system with two strong parties, the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). According to expe-
rience, one of these major parties supplies the Chancellor of Germany and
therewith nominates the federal ministers. Therefore, we model two groups,
the parties, which compete through expanding effort in a election campaign
for the majority in the Federal Diet. Simplified seen, on a second stage the
winning group, the party which holds the majority, has the right to elect the
Chancellor and the federal minister out of their party. For it they expand
again effort in the election process.
In view of the above analysis of the Between-Group model and the Semi-
Finals model we can say that under the assumption of absolute players-
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preferences the rent dissipation of the Between-Group model is lower. This
means that under this assumption the resources in the German election sys-
tem are spent more efficiently than in the USA system. If we act on the
assumption that politicians are status seeker, which means they have nega-
tively interdependent preferences, the resources are spend more efficiently in
the United States presidential election than in the German election. Sum-
ming up, it depends on the assumption of preferences whether resources are
spent more efficiently in a USA election system with primaries or a German
election structure.
4.4.5 Application: Awarding Prestige Sport Events
This section compares the awarding systems of the Olympic Games and the
FIFA World Cup. To host a match of the FIFA World Cup cities have
to go through a two-stage contest. On a first stage the country where the
city belongs to has to apply for the FIFA World Cup. Once the country is
assigned to the World Cup the individual cities in the country can bid for
being home for a match. This awarding system of the World Cup coincides
with the above explained Between-Group model.
In a stylized way the awarding system of the Olympic games coincides with
the Semi-Finals model. Countries around the world select cities within their
national territory to put forward bids for hosting the Olympic Games. On
the first stage cities in one country fight for the nomination as a candidate.
On the second stage the elected cities of each country bidding to host the
Summer Olympic Games or the Winter Olympic Games compete aggres-
sively to have their bid accepted by the International Olympic Committee
(IOC). The IOC members, representing most of the member countries, vote
to decide where the Games will take place. Typically, the decision is made
approximately seven years prior to the games. The bidding process for the
2012 Summer Olympics was considered one of the most hotly contested in
the history of the IOC. London and Paris made it to the final round of
voting. Paris was seen as the front-runner for most of the campaign, but
last-minute lobbying by London’s supporters was one factor that led to the
success of its bid. Partly this lobbying can be characterized as spiteful. For
example, the London bid consultants stated that the Stade de France, the
national stadium of France, was not adequate for athletics, an action that
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goes against the IOC rules which forbid to make statements about a rival
bid. In return the French President Jacques Chirac made comments stating
that the only food worse than British food is Finnish and that the only thing
the British have done for Europe’s agriculture is mad cow disease. In recent
years, the contest for the right to host the games has grown increasingly
fierce and there is a serious rivalry between the candidates.
Comparing the two-stage Between-Group model with the two-stage Semi-
Finals model is a strongly simplified comparison of the awarding systems
of the World Cup and the Olympic Games. Given the above results we
can state that under the assumption of absolute payoff maximizers the rent-
dissipation of the Between-Group model is lower and therewith the World
Cup awarding system is more efficient. If participating cities are spiteful and
have negatively interdependent preferences, the resources are spent more
efficiently in the awarding system of the Olympic Games.
4.4.6 Conclusion
This section examines the rent dissipation in two-stage rent-seeking contests.
Two different types of contests in which rent-seeking activities take place in
two stages are compared. Changing the common assumption of purely self-
interested preferences in rent-seeking contests, it is shown that the choice
of the contest structure is ambiguous. It depends on the type of preference
which the players exhibit. We find that rent dissipation given absolute
payoff maximizers in a Between-Group contest is lower than in a Semi-Finals
contest and given strongly relative seekers it is the reverse.
On the one hand this result carries over to the case of elections: It depends
on the assumption of preferences whether resources are spent more efficiently
in a USA election system with primaries or a German election structure. On
the other hand it carries over to the case of awarding prestige sport events:
There the efficiency of the awarding system of the World Cup or the Olympic
Games depends on the assumed preferences.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Further
Research
5.1 Summary
Contexts as seemingly diverse as economic organizations, sport competi-
tions, wars, competition for natural monopoly and patent race can be de-
scribed as contests whereby players expend resources to win a prize. One
special field of the contest literature is political rent-seeking. Rent-seeking
generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others with-
out making any contribution to productivity. A classical example is the
natural monopoly setting. The opportunity of making monopolistic profits
invites competitive rent-seeking expenditures on the part of the potential
monopolists to ensure the privileged position in the industry for itself by
influencing the politicians.
This work contributes to the branch of rent-seeking literature in contest the-
ory. It focus in all chapters on rent-seeking contests with a Tullock contest
success function. We extend the branch of literature by altering the assump-
tion on purely self-interested preferences. Precisely, we explore rent-seeking
contests, where players have negatively interdependent preferences. The set
of players is either homogeneous envious (Chapter 2 and 4) or heterogeneous
envious (Chapter 2 and 3).
For a long time the assumption of preferences being independent from other
players’ payoff has been unquestioned in economics. In the more recent
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literature, especially the literature about evolutionary game theory, it has
become more common to relax this assumption of purely self-interested pref-
erences.
The aim of the Chapter 2 is to show how negatively interdependent prefer-
ences can arise beside the evolutionary approach. One source is delegation.
Therefore, we analyze strategic delegation by firms’ owners to a manager,
first in the framework of Cournot competition and afterwards in the case of
Tullock contests. Previous literature about delegation in Cournot competi-
tion, like for instance,Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas
(1987) focus exclusively on simultaneous contracting. The first part of Chap-
ter 2 complements their studies by considering a game where firm owners
choose incentive contracts sequentially. We show that the leader chooses a
contract that leads to more aggressive manager behavior than the follower.
More aggressive behavior means that the agents behave as if they have more
spiteful preferences. This behavior creates a first-mover advantage for them.
The second part of Chapter 2 considers strategic delegation in contests. We
extend the standard Tullock contest by introducing in advance to the contest
stage an additional delegation stage. Unlike existing models we analyze the
impact of relative performance contracts on the delegation decision. First
we discuss simultaneous contracting. If there are more than two firms in the
market, there exists a unique, subgame perfect and symmetric equilibrium in
the simultaneous contracting case. All players react as if they have the same
spiteful preferences. Afterwards, we give an outlook on the changes arising
through sequential contracting before the contest. There again it ends in
heterogeneous players concerning their seemingly negatively interdependent
preferences.
The next chapter shows the different consequences these negatively interde-
pendent preferences can have for the outcome of different styles of contests.
In Chapter 3 we analyze standard one-stage Tullock contests, in which play-
ers have negatively interdependent preferences. Those prefernce functions
are of different interdependence. We study asymmetric equilibria in the case
of constant marginal efficiency. In the case of increasing marginal efficiency
we assume that the interdependent preferences of players are close but still
distinguishable. Then we can use a simple but powerful technique of linear
approximation. Its basic idea is that efforts of weakly heterogeneous players
in equilibrium are close to those of homogeneous players. The equilibrium
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of identical players with negatively interdependent preferences is well char-
acterized in the part before, and the behavior of weakly heterogeneous play-
ers can then be analyzed by Taylor-expanding the corresponding function
around the homogeneous equilibrium. In general it is interesting to know
how robust the symmetric equilibrium is with respect to weak heterogeneity.
In contests the elasticity of effort with respect to a player’s own preference
is large, which implies that weakly heterogeneous players respond strongly
to changes in their relative advantage or disadvantage. In this chapter we
stress the importance of the exact preferences in order to understand the im-
pact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the
game. The arising question is whether a small amount of heterogeneity of
players due to their different preferences is capable of causing large changes
in the equilibrium structure. Indeed, heterogeneity due to different prefer-
ences alters the structure of the equilibrium with respect to the question
who drops out first. A second question is whether the chosen technology
has an impact on the structure of the outcome. We calculate the threshold
values of the discriminatory power for which players sequentially drop out.
These threshold values are smaller compared to those identified for play-
ers with independent preferences. Therefore, the technology parameter of
rent-seeking contests has an impact on the structure of the outcome.
One purpose of Chapter 4 is to compare the rate of rent dissipation in a
Between-Group rent-seeking contest in which rent seeking activities take
place in two stages with those of a one-stage one-shot individual contest.
Especially, the effect of the extension by introducing rent-seekers with neg-
atively interdependent preferences is analyzed. Focusing on the relationship
between contest-structure and preference-type we find that rent dissipation
given absolute payoff maximizer is lower in a two-stage contest than in a
one-stage contest. Given players with relative preferences we find the re-
verse. Comparing aggregate behavior in hierarchical systems of federalism
(two-stage contests) with those in unified systems of a single central gov-
ernment (one-stage contests), these results show that the preferableness de-
pends on the assumption of preferences. This shows that it depends on the
assumption of preferences if more or less resources are spent in aggregate on
appropriative activities under a hierarchical system of federalism than in a
unified jurisdiction with a single central government.
Another purpose of Chapter 4 is to compare the Between-Group contest and
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the Semi-Finals contest, two variations of a two-stage rent-seeking contest.
In the first stage of the Between-Group model two groups compete. Based
on group expenditures, one winning group is probabilistically determined.
On the second stage, members of the winning group compete with each other
for the rent. Whereas, in the Semi-Finals model one player is chosen from
each of the two groups and then these two players compete for the rent. We
compare the degree of rent dissipation in the Between-Group and the Semi-
Final model. The contribution of this chapter is to extend these two models
by introducing rent-seekers with negatively interdependent preferences. Fo-
cusing on the relationship between contest-structure and preference-type we
find that rent dissipation is generally lower in the Between-Group model
than in the Semi-Finals model given that the players maximize absolute
payoffs. When assuming negatively interdependent preferences, we can find
the reverse. To carry this findings over to the framework of elections, we can
compare the German election of a Federal minister (Between-Group model)
and the United States presidential election (Semi-Finals model). Under the
assumption of independent preferences the resources in the German election
system are spent more efficiently than in the USA system. If we act on
the assumption that politicians are status seeker, which means that they
have negatively interdependent preferences, the resources are spend more
efficiently in the United States presidential election than in the German
election of the Chancellor. In summary, it depends on the assumption of
preferences whether resources are spent more efficiently in a USA election
system with primaries or a German election structure.
All in all we have seen that the assumption of (negatively) interdependent
preferences results in totally different equilibria in contests and therewith
in other preferable contest structures from a social welfare point of view.
For this reason interdependent preferences are not negligible in analytical
considerations.
5.2 Further Research
For a long time the assumption of preferences being independent from other
players’ payoff has been unquestioned in economics. In the more recent
literature especially the literature about evolutionary game theory it be-
came more common to relax this assumption of purely self-interested pref-
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Figure 5.1: Decomposed Game: the value orientation circle.
erences. There have been very few attempts to explain the influence of
other-regarding preferences in contest theory. This is particularly true for
the study of negatively interdependent preferences. This work is only an-
other step towards a proper understanding of the role of not purely payoff
maximizing utility functions and their potential within contests.
Furthermore, an empirical verification, particularly of negatively interde-
pendent preferences would be of great interest. This would help to indicate
how envious people are and how huge the spread of this spiteful preferences
in the population is. It has been long recognized that there is consider-
able heterogeneity in individuals preferences but little is known about the
distribution of preference types.
Another step would be to verify by a proper experiment the implications
of negatively interdependent preference in contests. A first attempt is done
by Herrmann and Orzen (2008), who investigate the importance of spite in
experimental rent-seeking contests. The patterns they observe are not con-
sistent with inequality aversion but with spite and excessive rivalry between
players. The problem in their work is that the pretest, a prisoner’s dilemma
game, cannot be used to distinguish between selfish types and spiteful types.
Therefore, we would suggest for further studies to repeat the lottery contest
experiment with another pretest, e.g. a decomposed game. Then, the hy-
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pothesis that individuals differ according to their social value orientations in
the effort chosen in a lottery contest is testable. We shortly sketch the idea of
such a pretest here: In order to test other-regarding behavior of individuals,
the decomposed game technique is employed in the pre-test. The decom-
posed game technique is developed by social psychologists (Wyer (1969),
Griesinger and Livingstone (1973) and Liebrand (1984)) and attempts to
assess an individual’s social motivation. Using this technique, subjects play
24 decomposed games. In each of these games, they are asked to choose
between two own/other payoff combinations. Each of these payoff combi-
nations assigns a certain amount of money to the subjects themselves, the
own payoff x, and a certain amount to the other subject, the other payoff y.
A typical choice may involve, e.g., a combination (75,−130) vs. (39,−145),
where one must choose between gaining either 75 or 39, with related losses
on the other’s part of either 130 or 145. The monetary values of these pay-
offs were determined such that when plotted as ordered pairs (x, y), in a
two-dimensional own-other payoff space (Figure 5.1), they would be located
at 24 equally spaced points around a circle, centered at the origin (0, 0)
and with an arbitrary radius of 150 monetary units. The pairs of subjects
playing these games remained unchanged throughout the whole classifica-
tion procedure. Hence, the payoffs received by subjects are determined by
the 24 decisions that they make themselves and by the 24 decisions that
are made by their partners. Subjects are informed of this, but in order to
avoid strategic considerations, they do not get any information concerning
the identities of their partners nor do they receive any feedback concern-
ing the decisions made by them. Adding up the amounts of money chosen
by subjects for themselves and for their partners separately, an estimate of
the importance given by the subject to the own payoff and to the partner’s
payoff is obtained. These estimates are used to approximate a vector in the
own-other payoff space, representing the individual’s type. Using a standard
classification procedure developed for this technique, subjects with a vector
lying between 67.5 and 112.5 are classified as altruistic (i.e. maximization
of other’s payoff); with a vector between 22.5 and 67.5 as cooperative (i.e.
maximization of the sum of own and other’s payoff); with a vector between
0 and 22.5 or between 337.5 and 360 as individualistic (i.e. maximization of
own payoff); and with a vector between 292.5 and 337.5 as competitive (i.e.
maximization of the difference between own and other’s payoff). The length
of this vector serves as an index for a subject’s consistency (i.e. it indicates
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whether the chosen own-other payoff combinations are the closest ones to
the subject’s motivational vector). Making 24 consistent choices yields a
vector length of 300 (twice the radius of the circle). Random choices, on the
other hand, result in a vector length of zero.
Once the preferences of the players are identified, one can compare the social
value with the effort choice in a rent-seeking contest. This could be pursued
in further experimental studies.
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